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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
COURT: Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir? 
DEFENDANT: . . . I mean I’m not denying what happened . . . . 
COURT: Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you can.1 
 
This short exchange at a bail review hearing in Maryland spoke 
volumes about the need for counsel at that stage of the proceedings 
and engendered a troubling state court conviction that illuminates a 
criminal justice issue of national importance.  The incarcerated de-
fendant, Donald Fenner, had just been arrested for a fifty-dollar drug 
sale.2  Without counsel present in court, he offered a rambling dis-
course3 before making his admission, probably stating whatever he 
 
 ∗  “Sua sponte” rulings occur when a court raises and decides an issue “on its 
own motion,” rather than deciding an issue raised by litigants.  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1464 (8TH ED. 2004).  This Article refers to appellate, not trial, courts’ 
“sua sponte” decision-making. 
 ∗∗  Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.  A.B. 1968, SUNY at 
Buffalo; J.D. 1972 Rutgers (Newark) Law School. 
My sincere thanks to the Maryland faculty for hosting two workshop presenta-
tions and for offering thoughtful comments and suggestions at different stages of this 
Article.  I am most grateful to colleagues Alan Hornstein, Renee Hutchins and Mi-
chael Pinard for their many contributions and extremely helpful comments and dis-
cussions.  Maryland law students Valerie Brezina, William Gamgort, Buffy Giddens 
and Paolo Pasicolan are deserving of recognition for their excellent research assis-
tance. 
 1 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1023–24 (Md. 2004). 
 2 Reporter’s Official Transcript of Proceedings (Trial on the Merits) at 27, State 
v. Fenner (Fenner I), No. 01-28360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County Jan. 15, 2002) 
[hereinafter Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript]. 
 3 See infra text accompanying note 58 for Fenner’s complete reply to the judge’s 
open-ended inquiry. 
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thought might minimize the bail amount set4 and avoid further de-
tention.  The danger and unfairness of such an uncounseled admis-
sion was manifest to the judge.  Yet that admission became central to 
the prosecutor’s otherwise weak case.5  Repeatedly invoking “I’m not 
denying what happened” like a mantra in summation,6 the prosecutor 
obtained a conviction and a twenty-year sentence.7 
Fenner’s bail proceeding illustrates why the pretrial release or 
bail determination hearing should be considered a “critical stage”8 of 
a criminal prosecution, triggering the Sixth9 and Fourteenth 
 
 4 While states’ bail procedures differ, Fenner’s misguided attempt to influence 
the judicial officer to set an affordable bail and avoid lengthy pretrial detention is 
understandable.  In Maryland’s unique two-stage bail procedure, defendants initially 
appear before a district (lower) court commissioner within twenty-four hours of ar-
rest.  MD. R. 4-216(e)–(f); see infra note 48.  Commissioners, like judges, are judicial 
officers empowered to order release on recognizance or to designate a bail amount.  
MD. R. 4-213(a)(4), 4-216.  In Fenner’s case, the commissioner ordered $150,000 bail 
bond.  See infra Part II.B.  Maryland procedures provide for judicial bail review.  MD. 
R. 4-216(f).  Following the commissioner’s decision, Fenner appeared before a dis-
trict court judge, where he made his inculpatory statement.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5 No police officer testified to observing Fenner engage in a drug transaction or 
could identify his voice on a recorded conversation.  Reporter’s Official Transcript of 
Proceedings (Trial on the Merits) at 273–74, 278, State v. Fenner (Fenner II), No. 01-
28360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County March 20–21, 2002) [hereinafter Trial II Tran-
script].  The State was unable to introduce corroborating marked money.  Motion to 
Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 49–51.  The State relied on the tes-
timony of an informant and his accomplice.  Trial II Transcript, supra, at 146–47, 
182–84.  See infra Part II.F for a detailed analysis of the State’s less than persuasive 
case against Fenner. 
 6 Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269, 282–83. 
 7 Reporter’s Official Transcript of Proceedings (Sentencing) at 60, Fenner II, No. 
01-28360 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick County May 9, 2002) [hereinafter Sentencing Tran-
script]. 
 8 The United States Supreme Court has identified certain pretrial stages of a 
criminal proceeding where counsel’s presence is required because “the substantial 
rights of the accused may be affected.”  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
569 (3d. ed. 2000).  In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967), the Court con-
sidered “whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights inheres in the 
particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.”  
Subsequently in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973), the Court explained 
that states must provide counsel for indigent defendants at “trial-like confrontations” 
where the lawyer is needed “to act as a spokesman for, or advisor to, the accused.”  
Critical stages include judicial proceedings such as formal arraignments, Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961), preliminary hearings, Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 
(1970), and confrontations outside the courtroom, such as a post-indictment lineup, 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218. 
 9 The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part: “In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense.”  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Amendments’10 right to counsel.  Counsel’s presence was essential to 
protect Fenner from making a statement he thought would help to 
secure pretrial liberty, but which ultimately jeopardized his right to a 
fair trial and resulted in conviction and substantial loss of freedom.  
Fenner’s trial attorney, however, did not advance the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel argument at the pretrial suppression hearing 
or upon direct appeal.11  Following the intermediate appellate court’s 
affirmance of Fenner’s conviction,12 his public defender petitioned 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Court of Appeals) for certiorari 
and relied exclusively on Fifth Amendment grounds, namely that the 
trial court’s failure to provide Fenner with Miranda advisements and 
an opportunity to consult with counsel13 should have excluded his in-
court statement at trial.14  The defender’s certiorari petition made no 
reference to a critical stage right to counsel. 
The Court of Appeals certified the Fifth Amendment Miranda is-
sue for review, but rejected Fenner’s contention.15  Finding that the 
judge’s question did not constitute “interrogation,” the court con-
cluded that unrepresented defendants like Fenner were not entitled 
to Miranda warnings that included the right to confer with counsel 
before deciding whether to respond to a judge’s question.16  It held 
that Fenner’s rambling explanation represented a “voluntary blurt”17 
that the prosecution may introduce at trial.18  The Court of Appeals’ 
 
 10 The Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s right to the assistance of 
counsel for all cases involving a possible prison sentence in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335 (1963). 
 11 Because Fenner’s trial defender never raised the Sixth Amendment or statu-
tory right to counsel at the bail stage, he failed to preserve the issue on appeal.  MD. 
R. 8-131(a).  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 12 Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 12, 
2003).  Although the Sixth Amendment issue had not been preserved for appeal, the 
Court of Special Appeals ruled sua sponte that bail was not a critical stage entitling 
Fenner to representation of counsel.  See id. at 10; see also infra Part III.A. 
 13 In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a 
person in custody and subject to interrogation must first be informed of the right to 
remain silent, that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court, 
and of the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during the 
questioning. 
 14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 
(Md. 2004) (No. 03-406) [hereinafter Fenner Cert. Petition]. 
 15 Fenner also raised a second, non-constitutional issue in his petition.  He un-
successfully argued that the trial court’s admission of a redacted version of his state-
ment rendered it vague and misleading.  Id. at 9.  The Court of Appeals also certified 
this issue for review.  See infra note 156. 
 16 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1034. 
 17 Id. at 1029 n.10. 
 18 Id. at 1035. 
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ruling negates Fifth Amendment protection for Maryland’s many un-
represented detainees, who speak without counsel at judicial bail 
proceedings and who are not informed that their words may be used 
as evidence at trial. 
But the Fenner court’s ruling went beyond finding a judge’s 
courtroom inquiry of an unrepresented and incarcerated defendant 
as non-coercive and not triggering Miranda advisements.  Unexpect-
edly, the high court ruled upon and foreclosed the broader Sixth 
Amendment guarantee of counsel to indigent defendants, an issue it 
had not certified in granting certiorari.19  Without the benefit of 
briefing by the defense and participation by the legal community, the 
Court of Appeals became the first state court of last resort to rule that 
indigent defendants’ constitutional right to counsel does not include 
bail proceedings, even where the unrepresented accused’s statement 
jeopardized his right to a fair trial.  The Fenner court’s constitutional 
denial of counsel made no mention of its ruling three years earlier 
that recognized an indigent defendant’s statutory right to representa-
tion at the initial appearance stage.20 
This Article explores what went wrong in Maryland and how to 
remedy the problem of suspects appearing and speaking without 
counsel, a familiar occurrence in state courts nationwide.21  Because 
other courts will likely face the issue of whether to admit bail state-
ments of an unrepresented defendant at trial, this Article urges that 
they travel a different path.  First, appellate courts must avoid a sua 
sponte ruling that denies an accused, and indigent defendants as a 
class, the right to be heard and to argue against a sweeping ruling 
 
 19 Fenner v. State, 837 A.2d 925 (Md. 2003).  See supra note 15 and accompanying 
text. 
 20 McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001) (holding that the Maryland Public 
Defender Act requires representation at all stages of a criminal proceeding, includ-
ing the initial appearance where a judicial officer typically determines pretrial release 
or bail).  See also MD. R. 4-213, 4-216; see infra Part IV.B.  Fenner’s trial counsel had 
not raised the statutory argument made in McCarter when moving to suppress his 
statement.  See infra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 21 Maryland is one of forty-two states that fail to guarantee counsel to indigent 
defendants at the bail stage throughout the state.  See infra notes 325–28 and accom-
panying text.  Sixteen states fail to provide counsel everywhere within their jurisdic-
tion.  See infra note 326 and accompanying text.  Twenty-six other states, including 
Maryland, provide counsel in only one or two select counties.  See infra note 327 and 
accompanying text.  An accused’s right to counsel at bail has uniform meaning in 
only eight states and the District of Columbia.  See infra note 325 and accompanying 
text; see also Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Le-
gal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719 (2002) [hereinafter 
Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?]; Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon: 
The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 [hereinafter Col-
bert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon]. 
COLBERT FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  10:42:20 AM 
2006] INDIGENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL 657 
that denies representation at bail.  Second, when ruling on the mer-
its, courts should recognize the critical importance of counsel at a 
bail proceeding to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial.  A lawyer’s 
presence ensures that the attorney, not the accused, responds to a 
judge’s general request for bail-related information and shields even 
the Mirandized defendant from the dangers of self-representation. 
Fenner’s rejection of counsel was not supposed to turn out this 
way.  Over forty years ago in Gideon v. Wainwright,22 a unanimous 
United States Supreme Court took a monumental step toward elimi-
nating the sight of ill-prepared, indigent defendants attempting to 
defend their freedom alone when facing felony charges.  Reversing 
the burglary conviction of Clarence Earl Gideon, an itinerant and 
homeless petty criminal, the Court ruled for the first time that in 
state felony prosecutions, every indigent defendant has the constitu-
tional right to be defended at trial by a lawyer.23  In contrast to the 
Fenner court, the Gideon Court invited and welcomed amicus briefs.24  
It assigned prominent counsel to advocate on behalf of Gideon’s con-
stitutional claim to counsel.25 
Gideon’s success had a dramatic impact.  It changed state courts’ 
practice of prosecuting and trying accused felons without a defense 
lawyer.26  It led the Court to guarantee counsel to indigent defendants 
 
 22 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 23 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45.  The Supreme Court proudly declared that “[t]he 
right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and es-
sential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”  Id. at 344. 
 24 In support of Gideon’s claim to counsel, twenty-two states joined a brief sub-
mitted by the Attorney General of Massachusetts.  Brief for the State Government 
Amici Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL 75209.  Additionally, the Su-
preme Court received briefs from the State of Oregon, Brief for the State of Oregon 
as Amicus Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 WL 75207, and from the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Florida Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), 1962 
WL 75208. 
 25 The Supreme Court assigned Abraham Fortas and Abraham Krash, partners in 
the prestigious Washington, D.C. law firm Arnold, Fortas & Porter, to represent Mr. 
Gideon.  Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal 
Justice, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1993) (remarks of Abe Krash, Esq.).  Two years later, 
Mr. Fortas joined the Supreme Court as an Associate Justice. 
 26 Gideon’s guarantee of counsel for indigent defendants has not resulted in 
States fulfilling their promise of ensuring a lawyer’s “effective assistance” of represen-
tation.  In many jurisdictions, an accused’s right to legal representation and ability to 
mount an adequate defense is severely impaired because of assigned counsel’s un-
manageable caseload and limited resources.  See Richard Klein, The Relationship of the 
Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact On Competent Representation and Proposals for Re-
form, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531 (1988); see also ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and In-
digent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice 
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in the more common misdemeanor case and to recognize the law-
yer’s crucial role before trial, when most cases are plea bargained or 
dismissed.27  The Supreme Court’s respect for counsel’s presence re-
sulted in extending the constitutional guarantee to pretrial “critical 
stages,” where an accused’s confrontation with a law enforcement of-
ficer or with the adversarial judicial process required a lawyer’s pres-
ence to protect the right to a fair trial and avoid “reduc[ing] the trial 
itself to a mere formality.”28 
Gideon and its progeny acknowledged counsel’s pretrial respon-
sibility, but left unanswered a crucial issue that Fenner and arrestees 
everywhere face after entering a state’s criminal justice system: will 
they have a lawyer to protect against making harmful statements 
when first encountering a judge and/or a prosecutor at a bail pro-
ceeding?  That is, does the constitutional right to counsel translate to 
counsel’s representation at a judicial bail determination to ensure 
that the accused says nothing to defeat their rights to a fair trial?  Or 
may a State delay counsel’s entry, as Maryland and most states do, un-
til a future court proceeding and risk transforming the judicial bail 
hearing into an evidence gathering procedure? 
Stated in constitutional terms, should bail be considered a criti-
cal stage of criminal proceedings that requires each state to provide 
counsel to protect indigents’ right to a fair trial?  The Supreme Court 
has not answered this question.29  Nor has it considered whether in 
the absence of counsel, a judge must provide Miranda warnings and 
tell an unrepresented accused of the right to consult with a lawyer be-
fore answering the court’s question.  Across the nation, indigent de-
fendants resemble the defenseless Clarence Earl Gideon when they 
first appear before judicial officers.  Some, like Fenner, speak and ar-
gue for personal liberty before trial.  Often they make damaging in-
culpatory statements, which, if admitted, render their eventual con-
sultation with counsel and preparation of a defense “a mere 
formality.” 
 
(Dec. 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/ 
brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf. 
 27 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 28 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984) (quoting United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967)).  See supra note 8 for examples of what qualifies as a 
“critical stage.” 
 29 For an argument that an accused’s right to prepare a defense and to regain 
pretrial liberty are critical stages that implicate the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments’ right to counsel, see Colbert, Thirty-five Years After Gideon, supra note 21, at 
35–37, and Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1771–75. 
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Fenner illustrates why lawyers must be present at state court bail 
proceedings to protect an accused’s right to a fair trial.  Absent coun-
sel, custodial defendants, even when given Miranda advisements, are 
likely to answer a judge’s broad “anything you want to say?” question 
in order to regain liberty30 and risk exposing themselves to conviction 
at the initial bail stage.  When they do make an incriminating state-
ment, the trial option becomes less realistic and available.  Moreover, 
when a judge’s “routine” and “proper”31 question yields evidence for 
prosecutorial use at trial, the separation between the judiciary’s im-
partial role and the government’s mission to convict the guilty be-
comes blurred. 
This Article contends that state courts must give immediate at-
tention to counsel’s crucial role at the early bail stage to fully imple-
ment Gideon’s “noble ideal” of “assur[ing] fair trials before impartial 
tribunals in which every defendant stands equal before the law.”32  
Had the Court of Appeals (and intermediate Court of Special Ap-
peals) required full briefing and argument, the defense and amicus 
parties could have explained the limited procedural due process pro-
tections that exist at state bail hearings.33  Maryland’s high court 
would have considered the constitutional and statutory right to coun-
sel with a greater appreciation for the plight of the unrepresented de-
tainee whose personal liberty is at stake.34  It could have then meas-
ured the impact of admitting the product of a judge’s broad inquiry 
on the accused’s fair trial rights.  This Article concludes that full ar-
gument would likely have led the Fenner court to recognize the neces-
sity of defense counsel’s presence, advice, and advocacy at a bail pro-
ceeding. 
Part Two of this Article examines the prosecution of Donald 
Fenner, beginning with his arrest and appearance before judicial of-
ficers and continuing to trial where, during closing argument, the 
prosecution made repeated references to Fenner’s utterance and re-
 
 30 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 31 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Md. 2004). 
 32 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 33 In the typical Maryland bail hearing, a defendant appears without counsel.  
Defendants do not physically appear in a public courtroom.  Commissioner hearings 
are usually conducted from inside a jail or police precinct.  See infra note 48.  At the 
subsequent bail review, detainees observe the proceeding on a television monitor 
from jail.  See infra Part II.C.  But cf. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–52 
(1987) (upholding federal preventive detention proceedings against constitutional 
due process challenge after concluding that “extensive safeguards,” including the 
rights to counsel, to appear in a public courtroom, and to confront witnesses, are in 
place to protect the accused). 
 34 See discussion of McCarter infra Part IV.B. 
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lied upon this crucial piece of evidence for conviction.35  Part Three 
analyzes Fenner’s appeal before Maryland appellate courts. 
Part Four of this Article considers and critiques the Maryland 
Court of Appeals’ sua sponte practice, first in ruling upon a non-
preserved and non-certified constitutional issue that the defense had 
not briefed, and second, by not discussing McCarter v. State36 in which 
the Court of Appeals determined that indigent defendants have a 
statutory right to counsel.  Part Four also explains why sua sponte rul-
ings involving broad constitutional and class-based issues are disfa-
vored and should be avoided, barring “most extraordinary” circum-
stances.37  Part Five examines right to counsel jurisprudence and the 
implications of Fenner in Maryland and nationwide.  The Article con-
cludes by exploring the possible remedies. 
II. THE TRIAL OF DONALD FENNER 
A. The Charges 
Donald Fenner’s involvement with drugs brought him into regu-
lar contact with the criminal justice system.  At the time of the instant 
arrest, he was thirty-one years old.  In his adult life, there had been 
“plenty of times” when Fenner remembered being “in front of a 
judge.”38  Fenner’s acknowledged drug problem39 resulted in two fel-
ony and one misdemeanor convictions.40 
In the instant case, Fenner was arrested for selling a gram of 
crack cocaine worth fifty dollars to a police informant.41  There was 
nothing extraordinary about the arrest, which occurred on the eve-
ning of January 9, 2001.42  It was a typical police buy-and-bust opera-
tion, involving an informant who had been told to purchase crack co-
 
 35 See Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269, 282–83. 
 36 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001) (holding that the Maryland Public Defender Act re-
quires representation at all stages of a criminal proceeding, including the initial ap-
pearance where a judicial officer typically determines pretrial release or bail). 
 37 See infra note 230.  
 38 Sentencing Transcript, supra note 7, at 57–58. 
 39 Id. at 57. 
 40 See id. at 60.  At sentencing, the prosecution sought a mandatory twenty-five 
year prison sentence based on Fenner’s two prior felonies for possession of a con-
trolled substance with the intent to sell and distribution of cocaine.  Id. at 4.  Fen-
ner’s attorney successfully argued against the mandatory sentence.  Id. at 48.  In sen-
tencing Fenner to twenty years, the judge noted that this was his third drug 
conviction.  Id. at 60. 
 41 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 27.  A gram is 
equivalent to 1/28 of an ounce. 
 42 Id. at 17. 
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caine from a drug dealer and who was promised favorable considera-
tion.43  Police officers in Maryland had targeted an apartment com-
plex known as a drug area44 and followed their usual covert operation 
procedures.  They wired the informant so that they would be able to 
listen to his conversation, provided marked money for the transac-
tion, and observed the scene through binoculars.45 
Seemingly, everything proceeded as planned.  According to po-
lice, the informant paid Fenner with a marked fifty-dollar bill and re-
ceived three pieces of crack cocaine.46  Police recovered the marked 
money from Fenner and the drugs from the informant.47  Although 
no officer observed the actual transaction, police presence at the 
scene, combined with recorded conversations and recovered drug 
money, corroborated the informant’s account and made the case ap-
pear to be a slam-dunk conviction when Fenner appeared before a 
Maryland commissioner.  However, as explained in the next section, 
the prosecution’s case was ultimately weak and tenuous, except for 
Fenner’s inculpatory statement. 
B. Stage One: Maryland’s Bail Proceedings 
Fenner’s commissioner hearing was conducted inside the local 
Frederick County detention jail.48  Because the hearing did not take 
 
 43 Id. at 18.  Frederick City Police Officer Tokars, the controlling investigating 
officer, testified that “the operation consisted of the use of a confidential informant 
with the direct purpose to purchase a controlled, dangerous substance, in particular 
crack cocaine.”  Id. 
 44 Id. (“The general target area was building four of John Hansen Apartments.”). 
 45 Id. at 19.  Officers traveled with the informant to the apartment complex.  Mo-
tion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 20. 
 46 Id. at 25.  The informant testified that a second person, the middleman or 
steerer, introduced him to Fenner and kept one of the pieces for himself.  Id. at 179. 
 47 Id. at 27 (“[T]he confidential informant handed over to me two rocks of sus-
pected crack cocaine.”).  The prosecutor then asked Officer Tokars, “And the $50 
was found on Donald Fenner?”  Id.  The officer answered, “That’s correct.”  Id.  At 
the suppression hearing, the court suppressed the marked money.  Motion to Sup-
press and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 49–51. 
 48 DOUGLAS COLBERT, THE PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S 
PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL SYSTEM 21 n.77 (ABELL FOUND. 2001), available at http:// 
www.abell.org/pubsitems/hhs_pretrial_9.01.pdf [hereinafter PRETRIAL RELEASE 
PROJECT].  Since 1971, Maryland district court commissioners, and then, district 
court judges, assume the primary responsibility for deciding pretrial release or incar-
ceration.  See supra note 4.  District court commissioners, like judges, are judicial offi-
cers.  Few, however, are lawyers or trained in law.  PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT, supra, 
at 20 n.75.  Commissioners exercise a very important role in deciding which detain-
ees are freed and who requires bail pending trial.  Md. R. 4-213.  Most district court 
judges maintain the commissioner’s bail amount when they review a commissioner’s 
decision the following court day even though commissioners render their crucial first 
decision with limited information.  PRETRIAL RELEASE PROJECT, supra, at 20 & n.76, 
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place in a public courtroom, no family or friends could attend.  Like 
most defendants, Fenner had no public defender.  In Maryland, indi-
gent defendants are left to speak to the commissioner on their own 
behalf.  They are not given Miranda advisements. 
Fenner probably would have welcomed a lawyer.  Despite his 
limited education and verbal skills,49 he could anticipate that his 
criminal record would hinder his chance for release on recognizance.  
But Fenner could not have prepared for how poorly he would fare 
before the commissioner.  The commissioner set bail at $150,000 for 
a fifty-dollar drug sale.50  Since hearings are not recorded, one cannot 
be certain what the alleged justification was for such a decision.  Per-
haps the commissioner concluded that Fenner’s prior convictions, 
other arrests, and missed court appearances warranted high bail.51  
Yet it is difficult to reconcile the extraordinary amount set with the 
constitutional and statutory requirement of ordering non-excessive 
bail.52  One thing was clear: Fenner could not afford it.  Unless he 
could convince the bail review judge to lower bail considerably, Fen-
ner would remain in jail until his next court date, one month later.53 
C. Stage Two: The Bail Review Court 
Later that same day, Fenner appeared at a bail review hearing.  
Neither the Maryland Court of Special Appeals (Court of Special Ap-
peals) nor the Court of Appeals described the circumstances in which 
Fenner’s bail review proceeding was held.  Nor did his appellate de-
fender provide a picture of what Fenner experienced when he ap-
peared unrepresented before the district court judge.  Similar to 
many Maryland counties, Frederick County conducts bail review pro-
ceedings by video broadcast.  Defendants are not brought to a court-
 
21–22.  They lack a pretrial investigative report to verify an accused’s family, em-
ployment, and community ties, and rarely see or hear from a defense attorney.  Id. at 
23–25.  Hearings are often closed to the public and are typically conducted inside a 
jail or police precinct.  Id. at 21.  Proceedings are not recorded or transcribed. 
 49 While in jail, Fenner was working towards a GED.  Sentencing Transcript, supra 
note 7, at 57. 
 50 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 54. 
 51 Sentencing Transcript, supra note 7, at 4–10. 
 52 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; MD. 
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 25.  In the author’s experience, judicial officers reserve 
bails of $150,000 for someone charged as a major drug dealer, not for someone like 
Fenner who, when arrested, had no drugs on his person and no money, aside from a 
marked fifty-dollar bill a police informant allegedly paid him.  See Motion to Suppress 
and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 27, 35. 
 53 Fenner appeared before the commissioner on January 10, 2001.  Fenner v. 
State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1023 (Md. 2004).  His preliminary hearing was 
scheduled for February 8, 2001.  Id. 
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room, but remain in jail and view proceedings on television.  Fenner 
saw and heard a judge speaking and was aware of an assistant state 
prosecuting attorney’s presence.54  One person Fenner knew was not 
there was his public defender.  In Frederick County, as in most other 
places in the state, public defenders are not present to advocate or 
advise indigent clients at bail reviews.55 
The hearing transcript indicated that the District Court judge 
never explained bail procedures to Fenner or informed him what in-
formation he considered relevant in reviewing the commissioner’s 
ruling.  Nor did the judge warn Fenner that anything said might be 
used against him at trial.  No pretrial representative was present to 
report on the importance of Fenner’s personal background and 
community ties, and the judge did not ask specific questions about 
his family, employment, or ability to afford bail.  At no time during 
the abbreviated hearing did the court inquire why the commissioner 
had set bail at $150,000.  Instead, the judge’s first words informed 
Fenner that a preliminary hearing had been scheduled.  The judge 
then posed the following open-ended question: 
 Sir, [regarding] your attempt through a guardian to have a pre-
liminary hearing, we have requested a preliminary hearing which 
is now scheduled for February the 8th.  Is there anything you’d like to 
tell me about yourself, sir?56 
Maryland appellate courts later indicated that they understood 
the judge’s general invitation to speak about “anything” to exclude 
 
 54 The Public Defender’s appellate brief included the preliminary dialogue be-
tween the bail review judge and the prosecutor at the start of the bail hearing, which 
was, at times, incomprehensible. 
THE COURT: . . . the whether that time (indiscernible) to amount to 
this history of failure to appear the State hasn’t let his bond of 
$150,000 would be secured as such. 
PROSECUTOR: Thank you 
THE COURT: Sir, your attempt through a guardian to have a prelimi-
nary hearing, we have requested a preliminary hearing which is now 
scheduled for February the 8th.  Is there anything you’d like to tell me 
about yourself, sir? 
Appellant’s Brief at 5, Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
Filed Aug. 12, 2003).  Fenner proceeded with his rambling statement.  See infra note 
58 and accompanying text. 
 55 Like many states, Maryland guarantees legal representation at a bail review 
hearing in a minority of counties.  At the time of Fenner’s bail review, only Balti-
more, Harford, and Montgomery County public defenders represented indigent de-
fendants at bail review hearings.  In the remaining nine Maryland judicial districts, 
defendants were unrepresented at bail review hearings.  See Colbert, Do Attorneys 
Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–27, 1732 n.57. 
 56 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 3 (emphasis added). 
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reference to the specific crime.57  But the court rulings never ex-
plained why they were confident that Fenner knew not to speak about 
the charge or what he could be expected to understand about the le-
gal significance of the judge’s words at a bail determination.  Most 
lawyers would have been baffled by the judge’s reference to a guard-
ian in a criminal case, who apparently recommended that Fenner ask 
for a preliminary hearing.  While Fenner too may not have under-
stood, he surely comprehended the high stakes of the proceeding.  
He heard the judge say his next court date was scheduled for Febru-
ary 8, almost one month later, and realized the judge’s bail review 
decision would determine whether or not he remained incarcerated 
until then.  But what should he say?  How was Fenner to make sense 
of the judge’s preliminary information and connect it to answering 
his question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself?”  
The court transcript captured most of Fenner’s rambling response: 
 For all the yes, activities, I don’t, I don’t know what you’re talk-
ing about over there.  (Indiscernible.)  I ain’t gonna, I mean I 
gonna (indiscernible.)  I can’t get no help on that, you know, they 
try to give you help.  That’s all they going to do is call and put me 
in jail and (indiscernible).  I ain’t playing it with the big boy, 
know what I’m sayin’.  (Indiscernible), Officer, what else is there 
for me to do?  Whenever I get, whenever I get caught with a little 
charge they never catch a large amount of drugs on me so, ac-
cording to the amount of (indiscernible) drug (indiscernible), 
you know what I’m saying, I mean (indiscernible) so I think like 
they just (indiscernible).  Whenever they catch, they probably 
catch me with one or two pills, Your Honor, this is just for me to 
make ends meet, to make money for me to be able to get by.  
They never caught me that (indiscernible) amount of drugs on 
me.  You know what I’m sayin’.  I mean I’m not denying what hap-
pened but when they caught me, they didn’t catch me with nothing 
but that $50. 
THE COURT: Sir, you need to have a lawyer just as soon as you 
can.58 
Absent counsel there was no one to protect Fenner from his own 
nearly incoherent and unfocused statement.59  Was his limited ability 
 
 57 Id. at 9; see infra notes 124–38 and accompanying text (describing and critiqu-
ing the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals).  See also Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1029; 
see infra notes 163–76 and accompanying text (examining the Court of Appeals’ rul-
ing). 
 58 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1023–24. 
 59 At times, Fenner’s speech was incomprehensible and the trial judge who de-
cided the suppression issue indicated he had difficulty understanding the tape itself.  
See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 51, 53. 
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to articulate connected to his level of education and intellectual abil-
ity, or to his uncertainty about how to reply to the judge?  Was he the 
“ignorant, illiterate or person of feeble intellect” the Supreme Court 
identified long ago as being in particular need of counsel’s “guiding 
hand”?60  Was Fenner sober and sufficiently alert and capable to make 
a voluntary statement?  Or was he merely acting as the anxious, un-
represented defendant who was alone and unsure of what to say?  
The judge never inquired and the record is silent.  But after hearing 
Fenner attempt to gain the court’s sympathy, one fact remained 
clear: the District Court judge knew Fenner needed an attorney. 
D. Admissibility of Evidence: The Suppression Hearing 
One year later, as Fenner’s case gradually moved toward trial, his 
public defender challenged the arrest’s legality.  In a pretrial hearing, 
the defender sought exclusion of evidence he claimed had been 
unlawfully obtained, namely his client’s statement and the fifty dollars 
the police asserted they recovered.61  At the suppression hearing, the 
defender convinced the judge that the police lacked probable cause 
to arrest.  The judge suppressed the marked money, but not Fenner’s 
admission at the bail review hearing.62 
The judge’s suppression order followed testimony in which not a 
single police witness testified to observing a drug transaction involv-
ing Fenner or anyone else for that matter.63  Indeed only one of the 
five officers who constituted the “back-up” team had even seen Fen-
ner before his arrest.  This lone officer observed Fenner standing 
alone near a building when the informant and a “middleman” named 
King approached.  According to the officer, Fenner, the informant, 
and King “appeared” to engage in a brief conversation before enter-
ing the building.64  Though the police recorded the ensuing conver-
 
 60 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932) (“[The accused] requires the guid-
ing hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. . . . If that be true 
of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or 
those of feeble intellect.”). 
 61 See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 12–16. 
 62 Id. at 50–51, 67–70. 
 63 See id. at 29.  The defense attorney asked Officer Tokars: “Officer Tokars you 
never observed any transaction . . . .”  Id.  The officer replied, “That’s correct.”  Id.  
Tokars then added: “To my knowledge, I would say nobody saw the transaction.”  Id. 
 64 Police Officer Stocksdale observed the informant and a second man walk to 
the building complex where they met “up with another subject who was later identi-
fied as Donald Anseld Fenner . . . . At that time [he] observed them all appear to be 
speaking together. . . . [and then] observed them all walk into the north entrance of 
building number four.”  Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 
39.  The officer did not testify to hearing the actual words spoken. 
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sation, no officer identified Fenner as one of the persons heard 
speaking. 
Without a police witness or recorded conversation to confirm 
Fenner’s participation during the claimed drug transaction, and 
without the marked money, the prosecution’s case rested heavily on 
the credibility of the informant and King, who also was separately 
charged and arrested.65  While the informant and King pointed to 
Fenner as the seller, their accounts of the events made both of them 
vulnerable to cross-examination.  Each had pending criminal charges 
for which they sought leniency.66  Both acknowledged using drugs to-
gether.67 
The prosecutor thus had great incentive to vigorously oppose 
the defense effort to suppress Fenner’s words at his bail review hear-
ing.  From the prosecutor’s perspective, Fenner’s admission was ex-
tremely valuable.  After all, what evidence of guilt impresses a jury 
more than hearing the defendant admit soon after arrest: “I’m not 
denying what happened.”  The defense, however, viewed admissibility 
as the State taking advantage of an unrepresented defendant, willing 
to say what was necessary to obtain an affordable bail and avoid ex-
tended pretrial incarceration.  What had begun as the nondescript, 
run-of-the-mill drug prosecution now posed a direct challenge to 
whether the right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination protected an accused at the bail stage. 
E. The Defendant’s Unsuccessful Fifth Amendment  
Suppression Argument 
The trial judge considered the legal arguments.  Fenner’s de-
fender focused on asserting that his client’s Fifth and Fourteenth 
 
 65 John Walter King, also known as Humpty, was charged with several crimes re-
lated to the drug transaction, including conspiracy to distribute and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, namely a crack pipe.  Id. at 25–28; Trial II Transcript, supra note 
5, at 189–91, 194. 
 66 The informant pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance and was 
awaiting sentencing.  Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 147.  
He also faced a violation of probation charge.  Id. at 171–72.  For his involvement in 
the instant transaction, middleman King entered a plea arrangement with the prose-
cutor in which he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and the remaining charges 
were dismissed.  Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 196.  King also faced a violation 
of probation charge when he testified.  Id.  Both the informant and King had prior 
criminal convictions.  Id. at 194–96; Motion to Suppress and Trial 1 Transcript, supra 
note 2, at 170. 
 67 The informant stated: “I used drugs with Humpty before. . . . he’s a user.”  
Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 150–51.  King added that when he and the infor-
mant used drugs together, they would take turns purchasing the drugs.  Id. at 200–
02. 
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Amendment rights were violated.  He argued that Fenner could not 
waive his privilege against self incrimination without Miranda warn-
ings and the opportunity to consult with counsel.  Because Fenner 
had been unrepresented and was in custody when the Judge posed 
his general “tell me about yourself” question, his defender argued 
that Fenner had been in a custodial interrogation and was entitled to 
Miranda advisements.68 
Fenner’s trial counsel distinguished his client’s situation from 
the unrepresented defendant in Schmidt v. State,69 where the Court of 
Special Appeals upheld the admissibility of an accused’s statement at 
a bail hearing.  While both Schmidt and Fenner had spoken without 
consulting a lawyer, Schmidt had been “Mirandized” and informed 
about the consequence of speaking.70  The unrepresented Fenner, 
argued the defender, never received his constitutional warnings.  In 
such a situation, he contended, Schmidt commanded suppression. 
At the suppression hearing, the trial defender relied exclusively 
on the Fifth Amendment argument and never asserted Fenner’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at bail.  Nor did he contend Fenner had 
a statutory right to representation, based upon a recent unanimous 
Court of Appeals finding that the public defender’s duty extended to 
all stages of a criminal proceeding.71  The defender also declined to 
challenge admissibility on due process grounds, by suggesting Fen-
ner’s mental limitations or state of mind supported the involuntari-
ness and coercive nature of his statement to the court.72  Failure to 
preserve these issues for appeal would limit Fenner’s appellate strat-
egy.73 
The trial judge then considered the prosecutor’s argument and 
reliance on Schmidt v. State.  The prosecutor contended that Fenner’s 
bail review judge, like Schmidt’s, had asked a “routine” question that 
 
 68 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 60. 
 69 481 A.2d 241 (Md. 1984).  Fenner’s defender mistakenly argued that Schmidt 
had been represented by counsel.  See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, su-
pra note 2, at 60.  Schmidt appeared alone at his bail hearing.  Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 
244. 
 70 In Schmidt, the appellate court rejected the defense contention that any incul-
patory statement at a bail hearing should be excluded under any circumstance.  
Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 245.  Police officers informed Schmidt of his Miranda rights.  Id. 
at 244. 
 71 McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195, 201 (Md. 2001); see infra Part IV.B. 
 72 Fenner’s lawyer, however, contended that his client’s statements were vague 
and irrelevant.  See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 58.  
Additionally, he argued briefly that the statements should be suppressed as fruits of 
the poisonous tree.  Id. at 66. 
 73 See infra Part III. 
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was “unrelated to evidence gathering or prosecution.”74  Such a judi-
cial inquiry, he contended, was not an “interrogation” requiring 
Miranda warnings.75  Consequently, the prosecutor argued, the trial 
court should conclude that Fenner had no Fifth Amendment privi-
lege to assert, much less waive.76  The judge agreed.  He declared that 
“there’s nothing inherently improper about [admitting] that state-
ment based on the Miranda case . . . .”77  The judge redacted most of 
Fenner’s comments, but indicated he would permit the portion in 
which the defendant said, “I’m not denying what happened.”78  When 
both sides objected to the abbreviated statement, the judge “con-
vened a chambers conference in an effort to have the parties craft an 
appropriate stipulation.”79  Thereafter, the defender stipulated that 
the prosecutor could present evidence to a jury that Fenner said, “I’m 
not denying what happened.”80  Defense counsel preserved the redac-
tion issue for appeal.81 
After ruling, the trial judge made a surprising reference to Fen-
ner’s mental capacity.  “I’ve treated Mr. Fenner as an adult when I’ve 
talked to him here in Court, I think any judge [would] and as long as 
we don’t believe someone’s incompetent [sic] is proper in treating 
someone as an adult . . . .” 82  Reading these comments one wonders 
what led the judge to refer to Fenner’s competence.  Had he reason 
to wonder about Fenner’s mental capability during the hearing?  
Perhaps he overheard Fenner speaking to his attorney and appearing 
to lack comprehension of the proceeding’s nature.83  Had the judge 
 
 74 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 63. 
 75 Id. at 64. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 69.  The trial judge ruled that Schmidt provided “clear guidance.”  Id. at 
68.  He believed that Fenner’s case was “simpler” since “the [bail review] Judge was 
trying to elicit information about Mr. Fenner personally, . . . [and] not trying to in-
vestigate the case itself.”  Id. at 68.  The judge continued: “It was custodial but it 
wasn’t interrogation in the context of Miranda warnings.”  Motion to Suppress and 
Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 68. 
 78 Id. at 71. 
 79 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Md. 2004). 
 80 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 78.  The stipulation 
also provided that a jury would be told that Fenner had no lawyer when he made his 
remarks.  Id.  At trial, this information was excluded from the stipulation read to the 
jury.  Id. at 245. 
 81 The defender stated: “I want to go on the record though and say that by my 
agreeing to that stipulation that I’m, that doesn’t mean I’m accepting the Court’s 
decision in that matter . . . . I’m not agreeing that that’s a correct decision.”  Id. at 79. 
 82 Id. at 69. 
 83 The following brief exchange occurred at the suppression hearing between 
Fenner and his defender before the State called a police officer to testify: 
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considered Fenner’s confusing bail statements as the product of 
someone with limited understanding?  Fenner never testified or pre-
sented an expert witness to support the claim that he did not speak 
voluntarily when he responded to the bail judge’s question.  Ulti-
mately, the trial judge’s suppression order sanitized Fenner’s inco-
herent ramblings by eliminating most of the prejudicial remarks.84  
Thereafter, neither his counsel nor anyone else raised the issue of 
Fenner’s mental state again at trial or before an appellate court. 
F. The Trial Evidence of Guilt 
At trial, the government presented the prosecution of Donald 
Fenner as a “real straight forward textbook type of case.”85  In his 
opening statement, the prosecutor built the foundation upon police 
testimony from members of the “drug enforcement unit.”86  Police 
witnesses, he said, would describe the arrangement with their confi-
dential informant and would testify to their presence at important 
moments in the events leading to Fenner’s arrest.87  The recorded 
tape conversation would provide jurors with a glimpse into the drug 
world.88  Both the police and the tape would bolster the informant’s 
and the middleman’s account.89 
 
MR. FENNER: How they got me charged (indiscernible).  What would 
be the (indiscernible)? 
MR. HARRIS: Well see these, yeah, we’re going to pick the jury today. 
MR. FENNER: All right. 
Id. at 16. 
Following the officer’s testimony, Fenner again seemed less than clear in re-
sponding to his counsel: 
MR. FENNER: Do I leave this right here? 
MR. HARRIS: Yeah, you can leave this here.  As I explained to you, 
these are lesser, this is a lesser included offense.  They can charge you 
like that. 
MR. FENNER: All right, no because, you know, this thing telling me 
they can’t do it.  I mean, I mean, I know what you’re saying. 
MR. HARRIS: Okay. 
MR. FENNER: I’m just (indiscernible). 
(Brief recess) 
Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 37. 
 84 The trial judge considered the defendant’s remarks excludable because they 
referred to evidence of “other crimes.” Id. at 69–70. 
 85 Id. at 92. 
 86 Id. at 92–93. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 93–96 (describing the testimony of the informants and contents of the 
recorded taped conversation). 
 89 Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 93–96. 
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No matter how much the prosecutor focused jury attention on 
the police, however, he knew his case ultimately depended upon ju-
rors believing these two individuals of questionable credibility—one 
seeking dismissal of pending charges, the other looking to avoid pun-
ishment for violating probation.90  They were the only witnesses who 
would testify that Fenner sold drugs.  Only they could confirm it was 
Fenner’s voice on the police tape.  To convict, the jury would have to 
accept their testimony.  The prosecutor looked for corroboration.  
Fenner’s admission fit perfectly. 
For the defense, there were many places to identify reasonable 
doubt and to persuade a jury to acquit.  Cross examination, said de-
fense counsel, would establish that the police did not see anything 
that may have occurred inside the building when the transaction 
supposedly occurred.91  The prosecutor provided no officer who ob-
served a drug sale or who observed Fenner engage in drug selling ac-
tivity outside the building.92  No one testified to seeing Fenner speak 
to passersby (before the informant and middleman approached), or 
exchange money for drugs, or enter and quickly leave the building 
on other occasions.93  No officer could state that Fenner even had a 
connection to the building.94  Before this arrest, he was an unknown, 
unlike the informant and middleman, who were familiar to each 
other (and to the police) from the drug trade.95  Moreover, no police 
witness would identify Fenner’s voice on the police tape.  And as a re-
sult of the suppression ruling, no officer testified that Fenner pos-
sessed marked money.96 
Fenner’s first trial ended abruptly when a discovery violation 
prompted the court to grant the defendant’s motion for mistrial.97  At 
Fenner’s second trial, the prosecution’s “textbook” theory remained 
largely intact.  The prosecutor delivered a similar opening state-
ment.98  He told the jury what they would be hearing from police wit-
 
 90 See supra notes 65–67. 
 91 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 92 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.  See also Trial II Transcript, supra 
note 5, at 276–78 (arguing, in closing, that without the testimony of the informant 
and King, the State had no case). 
 93 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying test. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See supra notes 64–67. 
 96 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 97 At Fenner’s first trial, the informant improperly testified to statements Fenner 
allegedly made after the drug transaction that the State failed to disclose during dis-
covery.  Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 185–90. 
 98 The prosecutor began by saying: “I wish I could present to you some big case 
you see on TV, you know lots of fun stuff and whatnot, but quite frankly what I’m go-
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nesses and “middleman” King, who would support the informant’s 
account.99  The prosecutor referred to other officers who would tes-
tify.100  He never mentioned Fenner’s stipulated statement—“I’m not 
denying what happened.”  Instead he asked that they “listen to all 
that evidence [and after you do] I will give a closing argument where 
I ask you to convict Mr. Fenner.”101 
The defense opening rejected the prosecution’s “routine and 
straight forward theory.”102  It highlighted the police failure to observe 
a drug transaction inside the building.103  Fenner’s defender urged 
the jury to examine closely the credibility of the informant and mid-
dleman and to consider their motivation to testify untruthfully.104 
The trial proceeded with few surprises.  The prosecution ulti-
mately did not introduce the recorded conversation, but its three po-
lice and two lay witnesses conveyed the important details of the drug 
transaction.105  The prosecution concluded its’ case-in-chief by intro-
ducing Fenner’s stipulated statement.106  The defense called no wit-
nesses and relied on cross examination to establish its’ reasonable 
doubt defense.  When both sides rested, each attorney and the trial 
judge had reason to believe the outcome was in doubt. 
G. Closing Argument: Fenner’s Words Echo Through the Courtroom 
This was one of the trials where closing argument took on added 
importance in the jury’s deliberation.107  The prosecutor spoke first 
and last as part of Maryland’s “sandwich” closing procedures.  Pre-
 
ing to be presenting to you today is really just a real straight forward case.”  Trial II 
Transcript, supra note 5, at 88. 
 99 Id. at 88–94.  At Fenner’s first trial, the prosecutor’s opening statement had not 
mentioned King as a State witness.  See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, su-
pra note 2, at 92–97. 
 100 The prosecution called Officer Stocksdale to testify to seeing the informant 
and middleman approach the defendant, apparently converse, and then enter and 
leave the building.  See supra note 64 and accompanying text.  He also called Ser-
geant Yingling who placed the confidential informant under arrest.  Trial II Tran-
script, supra note 5, at 223–24. 
 101 Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 92. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 93. 
 104 Id. at 95–96. 
 105 At trial, the informant testified that the defendant offered his pager number 
following the drug transaction.  Id. at 163.  A jury could have inferred Fenner was a 
drug dealer who was interested in more business.  At Fenner’s first trial, the infor-
mant’s testimony caused a mistrial.  See supra note 97. 
 106 Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 269. 
 107 See Anemona Hartocollis, In Summation, Power to Win Jury’s Favor: Last Chance to 
Tip Scales May Rest on a Wry Line, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at B1. 
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dictably, the prosecutor reviewed the testimony of each witness—the 
officers, the informant, and the middleman King, suggesting each 
testified honestly and truthfully.  “We have every, every piece to the 
puzzle. . . . [T]here are no pieces of the puzzle missing.”108  But the 
prosecutor must have realized that a juror could have found the lack 
of police eyewitness testimony and physical evidence less than con-
vincing.  Seemingly ready to conclude his summation, the prosecutor 
offered the final piece of evidence: Donald Fenner’s own words.  The 
prosecutor returned several times to Fenner’s admissions: 
[O]h I almost forgot about the stipulation when Donald Fenner 
appeared before the judge at the bail hearing he says, I’m not deny-
ing what happened.  So we have every piece of the puzzle.  I mean 
there’s no piece missing here.  Okay, I’m not denying what happened 
because it did happen.  Okay? 
 So did he sell, transfer, exchange a substance that was cocaine?  
Absolutely, folks, absolutely.  And did he conspire?  Absolutely, 
I’m not denying what happened.109 
Moments later, the defense answered most of the prosecutor’s 
arguments.  Fenner’s defender cast doubt upon the credibility of the 
informant and the middleman.110  He emphasized the limitations of 
the police observations.111  But the defender had no response to Fen-
ner’s admission.  He rested without offering an explanation for Fen-
ner’s incriminating statement. 
On rebuttal, the prosecutor concentrated on proving Fenner’s 
guilt through his own words.  Discarding the “textbook” theme, the 
prosecutor powerfully pled for the jury to believe the informant and 
middleman: no one, not even the defendant, denied he had sold the 
drugs: 
 The Defendant’s not denying what happened, [middleman] 
Mr. King’s not denying what happened, [informant] Mr. Hann’s 
not denying what happened.  What happened was Donald Fenner 
was dealing drugs in Hansen and he got caught.  That’s what hap-
pened.112 
The prosecutor then concluded by repeating the “what happened” 
theme over and over: 
 Once again folks, Mr. King’s not denying what happened, Mr. 
Hann’s not denying what happen[ed], Officer Tokarz isn’t deny-
 
 108 Id. at 268. 
 109 Id. at 269 (emphasis added). 
 110 Id. at 274–76. 
 111 Id. at 276–78. 
 112 Id. at 282. 
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ing what happened, Officer Stockdale’s not denying what hap-
pened.  The Defendant at a bail hearing, I’m not denying what 
happened.  No one on this jury should deny what happened that 
evening.  And what happened on that evening is Donald Fenner 
was distributing drugs and he conspired.113 
While one cannot know for certain what evidence or argument 
persuades a jury to reach a verdict, it is clear that the prosecutor built 
a powerful closing based upon Fenner’s statement at his bail review 
hearing.  Hearing the prosecuting attorney make fourteen specific 
references to the “everyone knows what happened” theme within 
such a brief time period could not be easily ignored.  Jurors had to 
consider that it was the accused who admitted his guilt when he said, 
“I’m not denying what happened.”  Such evidence was crucial to the 
State’s proof. 
Fenner was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in prison for 
his role as the seller in a fifty dollar drug transaction.114  His statement 
at a bail hearing, made without counsel present, may have been the 
decisive piece of evidence.  Should his statement have been admitted 
at trial?  Fenner’s trial counsel had preserved only the Fifth Amend-
ment Miranda question for appellate review and had not argued the 
Sixth Amendment issue that bail is a critical stage to the suppression 
judge.115  But in affirming the judge’s refusal to suppress evidence, 
Maryland’s appellate courts demonstrated an unusual eagerness to 
decide the broader Sixth Amendment right to an advocate at bail. 
III. FENNER’S APPEAL 
Fenner’s trial counsel vigorously, but unsuccessfully, asserted 
that his client’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination 
precluded admission of his statement uttered without consultation 
with a lawyer and without being advised of either his right to remain 
silent or the consequences of speaking.116  On appeal, Fenner’s de-
fender followed a similar Fifth Amendment line of argument that 
Maryland’s intermediate appellate Court of Special Appeals also re-
jected.  In affirming the statement’s admissibility, however, the Court 
of Special Appeals rejected Fenner’s Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel, an issue that Fenner’s defender had not raised or briefed.117  As 
discussed below, the Court of Special Appeals’ sua sponte ruling set 
 
 113 Trial II Transcript, supra note 5, at 283. 
 114 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1021 (Md. 2004). 
 115 See supra note 11. 
 116 See Motion to Suppress and Trial I Transcript, supra note 2, at 57–60, 66–67. 
 117 See infra notes 183–86. 
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the stage for Maryland’s highest court to engage in the same pattern 
of judicial activism and decide a constitutional issue it had not certi-
fied for review and as to which it had not invited or considered ar-
gument from the defense or outside legal community. 
A. The Intermediate Appellate Court Rejects Fenner’s Fifth Amendment 
Claim and Issues a Sua Sponte Sixth Amendment Ruling 
After conviction, Fenner’s public defender directly appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals.  In an unreported decision,118 the court 
affirmed the trial judge’s refusal to suppress his bail hearing state-
ment and affirmed his conviction.  Fenner’s appellate defender, like 
his trial counsel, argued for suppression on Fifth Amendment 
grounds.  He contended that Fenner’s in-court statement should 
have been excluded because it had been inadmissibly “obtained in 
violation of [his right to counsel within the meaning of] Miranda.”119  
The defender relied on Schmidt’s reasoning: “If an accused who is rep-
resented by counsel and who is made aware of his fifth amendment right vol-
unteers a statement deemed helpful to his position at a bail hearing, 
there is no logical reason why that statement could not be used 
against him at trial.”120  Fenner’s appellate defender argued the con-
verse follows: if counsel’s presence and an accused’s knowing waiver 
protected a defendant’s privilege against self incrimination, then 
statements obtained from an unrepresented defendant who had not 
been given Miranda advisements should be inadmissible.121  At no 
time did the defender claim Fenner had an independent Sixth 
Amendment constitutional right, or a statutory entitlement,122 to 
counsel at the bail stage.123 
 
 118 Fenner v. State (Fenner III), No. 02-706 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. filed Aug. 12, 
2003). 
 119 Id. at 5 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).  The Court of Special 
Appeals summarized the defendant’s Fifth Amendment argument.  “Appellant con-
tends that his statement should have been suppressed because he was not repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing.  He also claims that the statement was obtained in 
violation of Miranda . . . .”  Id.  See Appellant’s Brief at 9–12, Fenner III, No. 02-706.  
Fenner raised two other grounds on appeal.  He contended that the trial court’s jury 
instruction on conspiracy was improper and that the court should have instructed on 
the law pertaining to an accused’s “mere presence” at a crime scene.  Fenner III, No. 
02-706, slip op. at 1.  This Article focuses exclusively on the court’s sua sponte denial 
of counsel and its Fifth Amendment ruling. 
 120 Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241, 245 (Md. 1984) (emphasis added). 
 121 See Appellant’s Brief at 9–10, Fenner III, No. 02-706. 
 122 In McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001), the defendant first appeared be-
fore a district court judge, not a commissioner, after receiving a summons for which 
he had not been taken into custody.  The Court of Appeals held that the Maryland 
Public Defender Act requires representation of indigent defendants at “all” stages of 
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 The Court of Special Appeals found little merit to Fenner’s 
Fifth Amendment suppression argument.  The appellate court saw no 
distinction between Fenner being uninformed about his Miranda 
rights and Schmidt having been provided Miranda advisements, albeit 
from the arresting officer and not the bail judge.124  The Court of 
Special Appeals focused instead on whether Fenner had been in “cus-
todial interrogation,”125 thus triggering Miranda, when he answered 
the judge’s open-ended question.  The three-judge court conceded 
that the incarcerated Fenner had been in custody, but concluded that 
the bail judge’s question had not been an interrogation.126  The 
judges appeared perplexed that a colleague’s courtroom inquiry 
could be considered to have occurred within an “inherently compul-
sive atmosphere”127 or be compared to police questioning.  From the 
appellate judges’ perspective, a courtroom is unlike the coercive po-
lice station setting.  Rather, a courtroom is a venue where “there are 
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.”128  
The appellate court viewed the bail judge’s “routine questioning . . . 
unrelated to evidence gathering and prosecution . . . [and] general 
in nature rather than specifically related to any criminal offense.”129  
Fenner’s bail judge said the Court of Special Appeals had “merely 
asked . . . if there was anything he would like to tell him about him-
self.”130  The court found the judge’s question “proper . . .  in deter-
 
a criminal proceeding, including the initial appearance.  See infra Part IV.B.  McCarter 
would have supported Fenner’s claim to a statutory right to counsel at the initial ap-
pearance before a commissioner and, subsequently, to a bail review before a district 
court judge.  See infra notes 287–95 and accompanying text. 
 123 Fenner’s appellate defender likely was familiar with Maryland’s strict rule of 
preservation, Md. R. 8-131(a), see infra note 215, and was aware that Fenner’s trial de-
fender had not raised the right to counsel argument during the suppression hearing 
or trial.  See supra Part II.E.  The appellate defender never questioned whether his 
colleague’s failure to raise the right to counsel argument required the assignment of 
independent counsel to avoid a potential conflict between trial and appellate coun-
sel, a typical situation in public defender offices for attorneys who share the same cli-
ent and employer. 
 124 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 7–9. 
 125 Id. at 6. 
 126 Id. at 9. 
 127 Id. at 7.  The intermediate appellate court concluded, without further explana-
tion, that “the Miranda court did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial inter-
rogations as equivalent.”  Id. at 8 (citing Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241, 247 (Md. 
1984) (citations omitted)). 
 128 Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
 129 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 7 (quoting Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247). 
 130 Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
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mining an appropriate amount of bail.”131  It concluded that Fenner 
had not been subject to a custodial interrogation132 and was not enti-
tled to Miranda advisements. 
The Court of Special Appeals presented an incomplete and mis-
leading picture of Fenner’s predicament.  Overlooking the jailed cir-
cumstances in which Fenner appeared without counsel with bail of 
$150,000,133 the court declined to place itself in Fenner’s situation 
and see the judicial bail review as his only opportunity to speak and 
avoid further lengthy incarceration until trial.  From its vantage 
point, the appellate court appeared to picture a courtroom bail pro-
ceeding where Fenner “was brought before a District Court judge,”134 
where “impartial observers” were present, and where the judge’s be-
nign question was not “intended to elicit any information about a 
specific criminal offense” or even “reasonably likely to elicit [from 
Fenner] an incriminating response.”135  The appellate court was con-
 
 131 Id.  The Court of Special Appeals agreed with its conclusion in Schmidt v. State 
that the bail judge’s question about whether the defendant knew the alleged rape 
victim was “unrelated to evidence gathering and prosecution.”  Id. at 7 (quoting 
Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247).  Both the Fenner and Schmidt appellate panels understood 
“the purpose of the question was to enable the judge to set an appropriate amount of 
bail, not to secure information for the prosecution.”  Schmidt, 481 A.2d at 247.  
Whatever the judge’s conscious purpose, admitting Fenner’s statement considerably 
strengthened the prosecution’s case against Fenner. 
 132 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9. 
 133 The record did not describe the “totality of the circumstances” which led to 
Fenner’s inculpatory remark before the district court bail judge, including the pe-
riod he spent in pretrial detention prior to the hearing, the denial of counsel and 
circumstances of the commissioner proceeding, the jail setting where the public 
could not attend, and the impact of facing an unaffordable bail.  Commissioner 
hearings are not recorded or transcribed.  See Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 11 
n.4, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (No. 88). 
 134 Comparing Fenner’s situation to the circumstances it had considered in decid-
ing Schmidt, the Court of Special Appeals emphasized that Schmidt appeared “in a 
courtroom” when he made his statement, not “the police station . . . .”  Fenner III, No. 
02-706, slip op. at 7.  The Court of Special Appeals made no mention of Fenner re-
maining in jail when he viewed the proceedings through a television monitor.  See 
supra Part II.C. 
 135 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9 (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
301 (1980)).  In Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132 (Md. 1997), the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals adopted the “knows or should know” standard when judging a police officer’s 
interaction with a defendant.  Id. at 140.  “[C]ourts should carefully scrutinize the 
factual setting of each encounter of this type . . .  keeping in mind that the critical 
inquiry is whether the police officer, based on the totality of the circumstances, knew 
or should have known that the question was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response.”  Id. (citing United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1024–25 (6th Cir. 
1983).  In considering the bail review judge’s question to Fenner, the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals rejected the notion that the judge’s inquiry would generate a response 
such as the instant one.  Predictably, Fenner sought to mitigate the seriousness of the 
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vinced Fenner knew, or should have known, not to say anything 
about the crime or attempt to mitigate culpability. 
Fenner’s reality, though, was drastically different.  He never 
physically entered a public courtroom where he might have found as-
sistance.136  Looking at a television monitor from his jail cell, Fenner 
saw only a judge and prosecuting attorney.137  No defender was pre-
sent to counter the intimidating jail courtroom surroundings or to 
advise Fenner how to respond or explain the “intricacies of substan-
tive and procedural criminal law”138 related to a bail determination. 
Like most unrepresented and incarcerated pretrial detainees, 
Fenner was isolated.  From his perspective, the judge’s open-ended 
question provided no guidance, no explanation, and no specifics 
about what information the court considered pertinent to a bail re-
duction.  To the contrary, the judge’s inquiry unwittingly set a verbal 
trap for the captive Fenner, who could easily have translated the 
court’s words to mean, “Answer my question and I will consider re-
ducing your bail.  Do not speak and you will stay in jail until trial.  
You decide what to say.  Do not look to me for guidance.” 
Perhaps out of respect for the court’s presumed impartiality or 
because he thought he had no choice but to answer and attempt to 
persuade the judge to set an affordable bail, Fenner did what many 
would have done in the situation—he spoke.  Fenner portrayed him-
self as a small-time drug user in need of treatment, not an unreason-
able strategy for someone seeking to avoid the high bail given to ma-
jor drug dealers.  Fenner had not been warned that his words to the 
judge could later become the State’s evidence at his trial.  Judges, af-
ter all, are presented as neutral arbiters, not as “employee[s] of the 
State”139 or extensions of the prosecutor.  Still, from inside a jail cell, 
Fenner could feel the “inherently compulsive atmosphere” that com-
pelled him to respond to the one person who held the key to his free-
 
crimes charged and show that he was likely to return to court and posed no danger 
to the community. 
 136 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 10–11. 
 137 Id. at 11. 
 138 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).  In Kirby, the Supreme Court held 
that an accused’s constitutional right to counsel attaches at the “initiation of judicial 
criminal proceedings, . . . [where] the government has committed itself to prosecute, 
. . . [and where] a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of or-
ganized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural 
criminal law.”  Id.; see infra notes 144, 210 and accompanying text. 
 139 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 314 (2004) (declaring that the State of 
Washington’s sentencing procedures violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial because facts supporting the sentencing enhancements were 
found only by the sentencing judge and were never submitted to a jury). 
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dom.  The judge may not have intended to take advantage of Fen-
ner’s trust, but by asking a question and not candidly explaining the 
consequences of his answer, the court “tricked” Fenner into replying.  
The Court of Special Appeals, however, saw it differently.  It found 
that Fenner had not been subject to interrogation and, therefore, did 
not have to be informed of Miranda requirements.140 
The Court of Special Appeals then took a surprising second step.  
Although the trial and appellate defenders limited argument to the 
Fifth Amendment Miranda issue, the court asserted that Fenner’s 
situation implicated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  In terse 
language, the Court of Special Appeals summarily ruled that the 
“[a]ppellant’s contention that he was entitled to counsel at the bail 
review has no merit.” 141 In fact, Fenner’s appellate defender had not 
briefed or argued the right to counsel issue at bail proceedings, ei-
ther on federal or statutory grounds, because the issue had not been 
preserved.  Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals decided the 
broad Sixth Amendment issue sua sponte, without the defendant’s or 
defender community’s participation, a court practice that Maryland’s 
highest court would soon embrace.  Before examining the Court of 
Appeals’ ruling, the next section explains the substantial difference 
between an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and Fifth 
Amendment protection that Miranda provides against self-
incrimination during a custodial interrogation. 
B. Distinguishing an Accused’s Sixth and Fifth Amendment  
Right to Counsel 
The Fifth and Sixth Amendments provide two distinct and inde-
pendent rights to counsel.142  The Sixth Amendment right has been 
part of our constitutional system for more than 200 years and exists to 
maintain the adversarial system’s integrity.  While counsel’s guaran-
tee did not extend to indigent defendants until 1963,143 courts today 
recognize that a lawyer is necessary to balance the playing field be-
tween the accused and the State at trial and at “critical stages” before 
trial.144  Absent a lawyer at these proceedings, an accused’s ability to 
 
 140 Fenner III, No. 02-706, slip op. at 9. 
 141 Id. at 10 (citing Hebron v. State, 281 A.2d 547, 548–50 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1971)). 
 142 Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (extending Sixth Amendment 
protection to suppress the statements of an unrepresented defendant, whom the po-
lice questioned following his initial court appearance where he had sought counsel). 
 143 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 144 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). 
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obtain a fair trial is jeopardized.145  The Supreme Court has recog-
nized that, once adversarial proceedings commence and the State ini-
tiates criminal charges, a lawyer is essential to protect the liberty and 
fair trial right of indigents and “unaided laymen.”146 
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Miranda v. Arizona,147 
calling upon counsel to protect an accused from unfair interrogation 
practices, sparked controversy as to whether the Court based its rul-
ing on its general supervisory power over state criminal proceedings, 
or upon explicit constitutional authority.148  Miranda requires a ques-
tioning state official to inform the accused of the right to confer with 
counsel before deciding whether to speak.149  The Fifth Amendment’s 
purpose in summoning counsel protects the moral autonomy of a 
criminal prosecution by eliminating a coercive influence during a 
custodial interrogation.150  Once an accused invokes Miranda, the 
questioning must cease, and it may continue only after a lawyer has 
spoken to the defendant or upon waiver.151 
Consequently, an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel’s 
courtroom advocacy is considerably broader and more extensive than 
the limited Fifth Amendment right to obtain a lawyer’s advice and 
counsel to counter questioning by an advantaged state actor.  By 
definition, Fifth Amendment peril against self-incrimination is trig-
gered whether or not adversarial proceedings have begun.  Indeed, a 
suspect who invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel typically 
does so at a time when charges have not yet been filed and the Sixth 
 
 145 Id. at 399 (suppressing statements on Sixth Amendment grounds following de-
fendant’s lower court arraignment).  “Whatever else it may mean, the right to coun-
sel granted by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments means at least that a person is 
entitled to the help of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have 
been initiated against him . . . .”  Id. at 398.  See also United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 
264, 274–75 (1980). 
 146 Henry, 447 U.S. at 291. 
 147 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 148 Id. at 467.  In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Supreme Court 
resolved this conflict by ruling that Miranda is constitutionally based and not a Court-
made rule.  Because Miranda is a constitutional ruling, the Court held that Congress 
lacks the power to legislate by admitting the voluntary statement of a defendant who 
had not been given Miranda advisements. 
 149 Id. at 444–45. 
 150 Id. at 445–46 
 151 Id. at 444–45.  See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (suppressing state-
ments obtained during police interrogation conducted after defendant requested 
counsel); Michigan v. Moseley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975) (suppressing statements of a de-
fendant following his express desire to exercise his right to remain silent). 
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Amendment right has not attached.152  Conversely, an accused’s Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is triggered at a “critical” proceeding 
following the commencement of a criminal prosecution and contin-
ues to trial.153  It may or may not have been preceded by a custodial 
interrogation.  The significance of a court rejecting an accused’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by considering it part of the Fifth 
Amendment Miranda argument, is best understood by analyzing the 
Fenner court’s sua sponte denial of a lawyer at bail. 
C. The Court of Appeals’ Grant of Certiorari and Sua Sponte Rejection 
of the Right to Counsel 
1. The Defender’s Writ of Certiorari 
Other than the litigants, no one else in the legal community was 
likely aware of the unpublished Fenner appellate opinion or knew of 
the Court of Special Appeals’ sweeping ruling.  Consequently, very 
few people would have reacted to Fenner petitioning the Court of 
Appeals to review and reverse the appellate court’s ruling. 
Fenner’s petition for certiorari never challenged the Court of 
Special Appeals’ sua sponte denial of a poor person’s right to counsel 
at a bail hearing.  In urging reversal of the lower courts’ refusal to 
suppress the incriminating statement, Fenner’s defender relied ex-
clusively on the Fifth Amendment issue.154  The defender highlighted 
that the unrepresented Fenner had been unaware of his privilege 
against self-incrimination and had not been warned of the conse-
quence of speaking at his bail hearing.155  While the defender’s peti-
tion included other issues,156 he never attempted to translate coun-
 
 152 See generally Meredith B. Halama, Note, Loss of a Fundamental Right: The Sixth 
Amendment as a Mere “Prophylactic Rule”, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1207. 
 153 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
 154 In his petition for certiorari, the defender urged the court to rule whether in-
culpatory statements made at a bail review hearing by a defendant who is unrepre-
sented by counsel and who is not given any Miranda advisements are admissible 
against the defendant at trial.  He urged the Court of Appeals to identify under what 
“circumstances” such statements should not be admitted at trial.  Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 10, Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (No. 88). 
 155 Id. at 9. 
 156 In the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari, the public defender argued 
that “the trial court’s admission of a redacted version of the statement made at the 
bail hearing was error where the redaction rendered the statement vague and mis-
leading.”  Id. at 1.  He also included a third issue, which the Court of Appeals did not 
certify: whether, a “mere presence” instruction is required in a case involving distri-
bution/conspiracy to distribute drugs.  Id. at 1, 2, 10–13. 
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sel’s absence of Fifth Amendment protection to a separate and 
broader Sixth Amendment or statutory right to counsel at bail. 
Only a relatively small group of appellate specialists, who follow 
the Court of Appeals’ website and granting of certiorari,157 would have 
noticed the published order certifying Fenner’s Fifth Amendment is-
sue.158  Anyone reading it would have found no indication that the 
court intended to reach the issue of whether there is a constitutional 
right to counsel at bail. 
2. The Court of Appeals’ Fifth Amendment Ruling 
Concentrating on the issues the Court of Appeals certified for 
review, the appellate defender’s brief emphasized Fifth Amendment 
grounds for suppressing Fenner’s bail statement.  Citing supporting 
case law, the defender contended that an accused’s inculpatory 
statement, made without counsel’s advice and without a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent, should be inadmissible 
at trial.159  The prosecuting Assistant Attorney General responded to 
“Fenner’s principal argument . . . that he was denied his rights under 
Miranda.”160  The prosecutor argued that Miranda did not apply to 
courtroom bail proceedings, which were “entirely different” from “a 
police-dominated coercive environment of incommunicado interro-
gation.”161  Fenner’s statements, the appellate prosecutor asserted, 
were uttered “in the context of a [non-coercive] public court appear-
ance and innocuous questioning by a judge.”162 
The Court of Appeals agreed and unanimously rejected Fenner’s 
Fifth Amendment challenge.163  Like the intermediate appellate 
court, the high court refused to treat a bail judge’s inquiry as a “cus-
 
 157 Until recently, Maryland’s daily legal newspaper, The Daily Record, provided the 
only means for learning about Court of Appeals’ orders granting certiorari.  Tele-
phone Interview with Lori McGraw, Clerk, Court of Appeals (June 8, 2005).  The 
published order included the parties’ names, but did not always indicate the ques-
tions certified for review.  Id.  On February 10, 2003, the Court of Appeals began 
publishing grants of certiorari review on its website.  Usually the order included the 
issues certified.  If not, they “would be published soon thereafter.”  Id.  According to 
Court of Appeals clerk Lori McGraw, the court’s home page lacks a link to certiorari 
grants.  Id.  Readers must “keep an eye on it.” Id. 
 158 The court also certified the redaction issue.  Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1022. 
 159 Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 11–19, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88). 
 160 Brief of Respondent at 9, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88). 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1034. 
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todial interrogation” that was conducted in a coercive environment.164  
Rather than “carefully scrutiniz[ing] the factual setting”—alone, in-
side a jail and “appearing” in court via a video broadcast—the high 
court erroneously visualized Fenner standing before a judge in a pub-
lic, “open court” with impartial observers present.165  The court 
searched for proof that the bail judge intended to provoke Fenner’s 
response and found none.166  The high court refused to consider the 
bail judge’s question within the context of a judicial bail proceeding 
in which Fenner’s desperation and the bail judge’s power to remand 
or release him from jail challenged the meaning of voluntariness and 
psychological coercion.  To the contrary, the Court of Appeals be-
lieved there was no way the judge “should have known”167 that his 
general question would be “reasonably likely” to prompt the incar-
cerated Fenner to say something to minimize the charge’s seriousness 
and regain liberty.168  The court concluded there was nothing about 
the judge’s inquiry that suggested Fenner was subjected to [a] com-
pelling influence or psychological ploy to speak.169  It spared the bail 
judge from responsibility for Fenner’s rather vague and often dis-
jointed statement, which it considered less a “response” to the judge’s 
question and “more akin to a voluntary blurt.”170 
The unanimous Fenner court concluded that “[q]uestions posed 
to an arrestee by a judge regarding matters relevant to bail, asked in 
the setting of a bail review hearing, do not normally amount to an 
‘interrogation’ requiring that the arrestee be again advised of his 
 
 164 Id.  The Court of Appeals explained that Miranda was limited to custodial in-
terrogations, defined to “mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers.”  
Id. at 1025. 
 165 Id. at 1025, 1027. 
 166 Id. at 1029.  “There is absolutely no indication that the District Court judge’s 
question was designed to elicit an incriminating statement.”  Id. at 1028. 
 167 “‘[C]ourts should carefully scrutinize the factual setting of each encounter of 
this type,’ . . . keeping in mind that the critical inquiry is whether the police officer, 
based on the totality of circumstances, knew or should have known that the question 
was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”  Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1025 
(citing Hughes v. State, 695 A.2d 132, 140 (Md. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 989 
(1997)). 
 168 The court explained: “Just as an arrestee may give what turns out to be an in-
culpatory response to a routine booking question . . . petitioner gave what turned out 
to be an inculpatory response to a routine question posed by the District Court judge 
at petitioner’s bail review hearing.”  Id. 
 169 “We hold that nothing in the setting of petitioner’s January 10, 2001 bail re-
view hearing can be said to have coerced him into making his inculpatory state-
ment.”  Id. at 1030. 
 170 Id. at 1029 n.10. 
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Miranda rights [by the judge] . . . .”171  The Court of Appeals found no 
difference between the judge asking an open-ended “Tell me about 
yourself,” or a specific “Are you working?” question.  Both involved 
“matters relevant to bail.”172  Each was intended to give the defendant 
“a chance to explain . . . any circumstances that may have some bear-
ing on his bail that had not been already covered in the prior ques-
tioning.”173  Fenner’s bail judge, however, had not engaged in “prior 
questioning,” nor explained the “bail” information he was seeking 
when he asked, “Tell me about yourself?”  It was as though the high 
court expected the unrepresented defendant to read the judge’s 
mind and know what to say and what not to say. 
The Fenner court’s Fifth Amendment ruling and analysis is sig-
nificant and far reaching.  It represents the first time a state’s high 
court approved a prosecutor’s use of a bail statement uttered by an 
unrepresented and uninformed defendant to prove guilt at trial.174  
Fenner permits Maryland judges to initiate similar exchanges and ask 
general, “routine” questions of unrepresented defendants without 
requiring Miranda advisements.175  When the judicial inquiry leads a 
defendant to make an incriminating response, the new evidence 
eases Maryland prosecutors’ burden of proving a defendant’s guilt.176 
While Fenner’s Fifth Amendment Miranda ruling was startling, 
the decision was even more remarkable for its resolution of a consti-
tutional issue the defense had neither preserved for appeal nor 
briefed or argued before the court: whether the right to counsel at 
bail hearings exists. 
 
 171 Id. at 1030.  The court found it unnecessary to require that Fenner be Miran-
dized “again.”  Id.  The record, however, suggests he had never been advised prior to 
the hearing.  See supra Part II.E (summarizing the public defender’s suppression ar-
gument, which never mentioned that the police advised Fenner of his Miranda rights 
and which distinguished Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241 (Md. 1984), where the police 
did, in fact, Mirandize the defendant).  Though the court found that Miranda was 
not constitutionally required, it urged trial judges to warn detainees, “as a matter of 
good practice and policy,” that their statements may be used at trial.  Fenner IV, 846 
A.2d at 1030 n.11. 
 172 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030. 
 173 Id. at 1029. 
 174 Bailey v. State, 490 A.2d 158 (Del. 1983) (admitting for impeachment purposes 
an unrepresented defendant’s statement at a bail proceeding); State v. Patten, 631 
A.2d 921 (N.H. 1993) (admitting statements of an unrepresented defendant at bail 
who had been given Miranda warnings); People v. North, 439 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1981). 
 175 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  The court suggested trial courts 
should be “extra careful” in questioning detainees and “should focus on questions 
relating solely to the pretrial release decision.”  Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.11. 
 176 See Schmidt v. State, 481 A.2d 241 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984). 
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3. The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s Sua Sponte Denial 
of the Right to Counsel 
Following dismissal of Fenner’s Fifth Amendment claim, the 
Court of Appeals would have been expected to move to the only 
other issue that it had certified in the defendant’s petition for certio-
rari: the trial judge’s redacted version of Fenner’s statement.177  In-
stead, the court sharply detoured from standard appellate practice by 
deciding an uncertified constitutional issue: Fenner’s right to a law-
yer at bail.178  The court acknowledged that Fenner’s defender had 
not addressed or “clearly frame[d] this issue separately” in his certio-
rari petition,179 and recognized that “it appears only in the context of 
the question relating to the Miranda warnings issue.”180  Indeed, it is 
mystifying why the high court—after already denying Fenner’s sup-
pression motion—would contravene conventional practice and de-
cide a separate, unraised issue.  Additionally, the ruling of the Court 
of Appeals undermined its strong policy of not deciding a constitu-
tional issue when the court can resolve the case on non-constitutional 
grounds.181  As explained below, such a non-constitutional, statutory 
basis existed for not sustaining the right-to-counsel ruling of the 
Court of Special Appeals.182 
Despite these procedural irregularities, the high court boldly de-
clared, without explanation, that its Fifth Amendment ruling “neces-
sarily leads us to petitioner’s next argument as to why his inculpatory 
statement should have been declared inadmissible—his lack of coun-
sel at the bail review hearing.”183  Unfortunately, Fenner’s “next ar-
gument” never materialized in his brief.184  Limited by the trial re-
cord, the defender’s written argument concentrated on the Fifth 
 
 177 See supra note 156. 
 178 Md. Rule 8-131(b) provides that if a higher court addresses an issue not raised 
or decided in the lower court, ordinarily the issue must have been raised in the peti-
tion for writ of certiorari. 
 179 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.12.  “The question in petitioner’s certiorari peti-
tion did not clearly frame this issue separately; it appears only in the context of the 
question relating to the Miranda warnings issue.  It was, however, argued in the 
briefs.”  Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 See infra note 253. 
 182 See infra notes 282–86 and accompanying text. 
 183 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030. 
 184 See id. 
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Amendment and redaction issues.185  More accurately, the Court of 
Appeals raised and decided the Sixth Amendment issue on its own.186 
The Court of Appeals’ published opinion mischaracterized Fen-
ner’s appellate position.  Though Fenner’s brief had not included the 
Sixth Amendment “critical stage,” right to counsel argument,187 the 
court mistakenly asserted that he had “argued in the briefs”188 in sup-
port of such a right.189  In actuality, the ruling denying counsel at bail 
to indigent defendants was rendered without the benefit of briefing 
by the defendant or the bar.  Unlike the United States Supreme 
Court’s interest in appointing counsel and in welcoming amici briefs 
to protect indigent defendants’ right to representation in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,190 the Court of Appeals never provided such an opportu-
nity to the outside legal community. 
Perhaps even more alarming than not calling for defense and 
considering amici briefs, the Court of Appeals decided the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel issue by weighing only one side’s argu-
ment and briefing: the State Attorney General’s.  The prosecutor’s 
Sixth Amendment brief forcefully contended that the Court of Ap-
peals should reject a claim that bail was a critical stage requiring 
counsel.191  The defender filed no supplemental reply to the State’s 
constitutional argument.192 
Indeed, the only time Fenner’s defender mentioned the Sixth 
Amendment right-to-counsel argument was briefly during oral argu-
ment.193  The defender initially tried to place the judges of the Court 
 
 185 During oral argument, Fenner’s appellate defender briefly referenced the 
Sixth Amendment critical stage analysis.  See infra notes 193–202. 
 186 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030–33. 
 187 Petitioner’s Brief and Appendix at 9–19, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88) 
(stating only two grounds: the Fifth Amendment and the redaction issue). 
 188 See supra note 179.  No such argument, however, appeared in Fenner’s brief. 
 189 See Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030 n.12. 
 190 372 U.S. 335 (1963); see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 191 The State’s brief contended that the right to counsel had not attached at Fen-
ner’s bail proceeding because he was not facing “formal adversary judicial proceed-
ings” and that a bail review hearing is not such a proceeding.  Brief of Respondent at 
20, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d (No. 88) (citing Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004); 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 
(1984)). 
 192 The defender’s only other point heading addressed the trial court’s redacted 
statement.  He argued redaction made the statement vague, misleading, and inad-
missible.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9–10, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 (No. 88). 
 193 See Taped Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020 [herein-
after Taped Transcript of Oral Argument] (on file with author). 
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of Appeals in the role of Fenner’s bail review judge194 by suggesting 
that, had they been the presiding bail judge, each would have taken 
measures to “stop this guy [Fenner] from talking”195 and would have 
asked narrow questions concerning bail.196  The high court, however, 
showed little interest in accepting this role or in applying Miranda to 
a bail hearing197 and creating an exclusionary rule barring an ac-
cused’s bail statement at trial.198  After the judges appeared unsympa-
thetic to Fenner’s plight of speaking without having conferred with 
 
 194 The defender asked the Court of Appeals “to imagine yourselves, transport 
yourselves, to the district court.  You’re sitting at a bail review, and this is what you 
hear as they ask the accused, ‘Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, 
sir?’”  Id. at 1.  The defender proceeded to read Fenner’s statement until a judge in-
terrupted and showed little inclination to respond to the defender’s scenario: “Your 
position is that this is a custodial interrogation at a bail review hearing.”  Id. at 2. 
 195 Id. at 3. 
 196 The defender suggested that the bail review judge might have properly asked 
bail-related questions that were not connected to the criminal charge.  “Why can’t a 
[judge] ask narrowly tailored questions like: Are you employed?  Do you have com-
munity ties? . . . [A]re you married?  Do you have children?  Those sorts of things to 
help to determine bail.”  Id. at 4. 
 197 The inquiring judge expressed strong concern that informing an accused 
about the right to counsel would delay the bail proceedings: 
JUDGE (MALE #2): . . . So look at Miranda warnings and all of them 
say I want a lawyer.  It’s just one of the ideas to qualify him for a lawyer 
today.  Now you’ve got Edwards into it and can’t ask him anything.  
You’ve gotta stop everything ‘cause he says I want a lawyer.  How’s the 
judge gonna make a bail decision? 
     . . . 
     . . . Now if the first thing after Miranda is he elects a lawyer, want a 
lawyer, everything stops.  So I want a lawyer.  Everything stops. 
     . . . 
     . . . I can’t do anything more at that point. 
     . . . 
     . . . And then what exactly?  Well, you know what the jails are gonna 
look like? 
     . . . 
     . . . Just look at the implications. 
     . . . 
     . . . of applying Miranda to this. 
Id. at 2–4. 
 198 See Taped Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193, at 2–4.  The hearing 
continued: 
[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: . . . So I think that you have to be warned.  And 
if you’re not, your statements can’t be used against you. 
JUDGE (MALE #2): You did this in one context by rule, by making 
statements made at plea bargaining inadmissible if the plea doesn’t go 
down.  That was done by rule, not by invoking any constitutional 
[right].  Wouldn’t this be the same thing?  It’s just a matter of public 
policy. 
Id. at 6. 
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counsel, the defender tried a different approach.  He mentioned that 
“even the sixth amendment”199 explained the need for legal represen-
tation at bail, but the court swiftly dismissed the Sixth Amendment’s 
relevance. 
 [Public Defender]: I just think that there is this dance that is 
done between the judge and the defendants: tell me about your-
self.  It’s a strange . . . [cutoff by judge].  
 . . . 
 . . . I mean, as far as the constitutional question goes, as we 
move to the fifth amendment right to counsel and right to silence 
and even the sixth amendment right to counsel, there is this strange 
gap. 
 Judge (female #1): You’re not suggesting there is a sixth amend-
ment right to counsel here? 
 [Public Defender]: Yeah, I think I am.  That’s part of what the 
argument was in Schmidt and that’s . . . [cutoff by judge]. 
 Judge (female #1): You’re saying the sixth amendment right to 
counsel touches at a bail hearing? 
 [Public Defender]: I think that this court can determine pursu-
ant to the charging documents we receive at this bail hearing, 
which, I would argue, is much more like an arraignment than [a] 
bail hearing, thus triggering as a proof of stage [i.e., a critical 
stage] or as an adversarial proceeding [which would trigger] . . . 
the sixth amendment [right] of counsel.  And you can do that 
without offending the Constitution because states have . . . [cutoff 
by judge]. 
 . . . 
 . . . And you could see he’s charged with felonies . . . . But 
there’s no reason you couldn’t back it up and say, look he’s 
charged.  The prosecution has begun.200 
The limited dialogue abruptly concluded when the Court of Appeals 
judges returned to other Fifth Amendment concerns.201  The de-
fender said nothing further about the Sixth Amendment during his 
remaining time.202  The court heard no response from the defender 
or the outside legal community when the appellate prosecutor dis-
missively opposed the Sixth Amendment claim to counsel at bail.203 
 
 199 Id. at 7. 
 200 Id. at 6–7 (emphasis added). 
 201 See id. at 8. 
 202 See id. at 8–12. 
 203 During oral argument, the prosecuting Assistant Attorney General summarily 
dismissed the contention that Fenner had the Sixth Amendment right to counsel: 
[ATTORNEY GENERAL]: . . . On the right to counsel, clearly there is 
no constitutional right to counsel here.  That does not attach until 
there has been a preliminary hearing, the filing of a criminal informa-
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4. The Court Ruling: Rejecting Bail as a Critical Stage 
The Court of Appeals embraced the State’s “fully argued” posi-
tion and denied indigent defendants’ right to a lawyer when they ap-
pear before a district court bail review judge.204  From the outset, the 
court evidenced an interest in deciding the constitutional issue.  The 
court overlooked Fenner’s failure to raise and preserve the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel during the suppression hearing,205 
which is usually a fatal procedural flaw.  Instead, the court trans-
formed Fenner’s Fifth Amendment denial of counsel claim into a 
critical stage analysis.  It inaccurately asserted that Fenner had raised 
the Sixth Amendment position when he “contend[ed] that the Cir-
cuit Court judge erred in allowing his statement to be admissible at 
trial due to his lack of legal counsel at the bail review hearing.”206  
Fenner’s trial attorney, however, had not argued the Sixth Amend-
ment to the circuit court judge, thus explaining why Fenner’s appel-
late defender limited his certiorari petition and brief to the Fifth 
Amendment argument. 
The court’s Sixth Amendment analysis reveals the danger of ap-
pellate judges deciding a constitutional issue without zealous and vig-
orous advocacy from both parties and the legal community.  Al-
though the State filed criminal charges against Fenner and a judicial 
officer had set bail, the court stated that “adversarial judicial criminal 
proceedings”207 had not yet commenced that would have entitled him 
 
tion or a circuit court arraignment.  These charges were not triable in 
the district court.  The district court did not have jurisdiction to try 
these cases.  Clearly, there was no right to counsel here. 
Taped Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 193, at 10. 
 204 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1031 (Md. 2004).  The court relied 
on a prior Court of Special Appeals ruling in Hebron v. State, 281 A.2d 547 (Md. 
1971).  Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1031.  Referring to Maryland Rule 4-213, the court de-
clared that the right to counsel was limited to critical stages of a criminal proceeding.  
Id. at 1033.  The court never connected counsel’s absence at the time Fenner made 
his statement to a critical stage “where the defense on the merits would be impaired.”  
Id. at 1031 (quoting United States v. Hooker, 418 F.Supp. 476, 479 (M.D. Pa. 1976), 
aff’d mem., 547 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977)).  The court 
also never connected counsel’s absence at the time Fenner made his statement to 
causing “‘potential substantial prejudice’ to ‘the defendant’s basic right to a fair 
trial.’”  Id. (quoting Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979) (quoting 
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967))). 
 205 See infra note 215. 
 206 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1030. 
 207 Id. at 1031 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is triggered] at or after the time that judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated . . . ‘whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, 
indictment, information, or arraignment.’”) (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 
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to counsel.  The court’s technical distinction between a prosecutor 
not commencing prosecution by filing charges, compared to initiat-
ing a “formal” accusation through indictment or information, went 
unchallenged.  So, too, did the court’s unexplained differentiation 
between the right to counsel “attaching” at an indigent defendant’s 
“formal” arraignment but not applying to lower court arraignment 
proceedings conducted before judicial officers who advise an accused 
of the charges and his or her rights.208 
Having concluded that Fenner, though facing criminal charges, 
did not have the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because adversar-
ial proceedings had unexplainably not commenced, the Court of Ap-
peals next considered the State’s argument that Fenner’s bail hearing 
was not a “critical” proceeding that required the State to provide a 
lawyer.  Had Fenner been “‘confronted, just as at trial, by the proce-
dural system, or by his expert adversary, or by both . . . .’”?209  Was the 
courtroom exchange between the bail review judge and Fenner the 
type of situation that “‘might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce 
the trial to a mere formality.’”?210  Had the Sixth Amendment critical 
stage issue been preserved and certified, an advocate would have vig-
orously responded in the affirmative.  The advocate could have 
pointed out that Fenner faced a prosecutor and a judge without 
counsel and was “confronted” by the procedural intricacies and nu-
ances of a bail system when faced with the judge’s question, “Is there 
anything you’d like to tell me about yourself?”  The advocate could 
have asserted that “the result of this judicial confrontation,” Fenner’s 
statement, arguably shaped his fate at trial.  The advocate could have 
applied the same case law that the Court of Appeals cited and con-
tended that Fenner’s “adversary confrontation”211 with the judge and 
prosecutor had “impaired” his defense “on the merits”212 by produc-
 
689 (1972))); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991); Michigan v. Jackson, 
475 U.S. 625 (1986). 
 208 See Fenner IV, 846 A.2d 1020. 
 209 Id. at 1031 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)). 
 210 Id. (quoting Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 189). 
 211 Id. (quoting Padgett v. State, 590 P.2d 432, 436 (Alaska 1979)); see also United 
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 319 (1973).  In Ash, Justice Blackmun noted that a law-
yer’s presence is critical to balance “any inequality in the adversary process” and to 
assure that there is “no possibility . . . that the accused might be misled by his lack of 
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.”  Ash, 413 U.S. 
at 317–19. 
 212 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1974).  In Gerstein, Justice Powell ex-
plained that the Court had identified a critical stage as a pretrial procedure “that 
would impair defense on the merits if the accused is required to proceed without 
counsel.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
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ing evidence that caused “substantial prejudice” to his “basic right to 
a fair trial.”213  Counsel could have refuted the court’s view that the 
bail hearing had only been “for the purpose of setting the appropri-
ate amount of bail.”214  An advocate would have asserted that Fenner’s 
statement had been crucial prosecutorial evidence and derogated his 
right to be judged fairly at trial.  No advocate, however, delivered an 
alternative perspective to the State’s position. 
This sua sponte ruling denied indigents an opportunity to reply 
and take issue with the court’s declaration that they had no constitu-
tional right to counsel at bail.  Ruling without legal briefs by the de-
fendant and absent advocacy from the legal community interested in 
fulfilling Gideon’s promise, Fenner silenced an entire class from argu-
ing that the fundamental constitutional right to counsel should ex-
tend to bail proceedings.  Part IV of this Article explains why such 
broad, class-based sua sponte practices are strongly discouraged. 
IV. APPELLATE COURTS’ SUA SPONTE PRACTICE 
The troubling Fenner scenario stands in stark contrast to the 
manner in which appellate courts generally decide criminal appeals 
and rule on issues of constitutional dimension.  In approaching such 
questions, the parties are usually aware of the issues that an appellate 
court plans to consider.  They submit legal briefs to persuade the 
judges to rule in their favor.  Like most states’ rule on preservation, 
Maryland appellate courts only review issues that had been presented 
to the trial judge.215  Issues not raised at trial are generally barred on 
direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Thereafter, when the 
Court of Appeals considers and grants certiorari review, the court or-
der specifies what questions it will decide.  Aside from “a very limited 
number of circumstances,”216 appellate advocates are clear that at this 
final level of judicial scrutiny, the Court of Appeals will “consider only 
an issue that has been raised in the petition for certiorari.”217  Certify-
ing questions for high court review not only informs the parties, but 
 
 213 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 214 Fenner IV, 846 A.2d at 1031. 
 215 MD. R. 8-131(a) provides that, “Ordinarily the appellate court will not decide 
any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or de-
cided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue if necessary or desir-
able to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of another appeal.”  
None of these exceptions applied to Fenner. 
 216 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (citation omitted). 
 217 MD. R. 8-131(b).  See also supra note 178; Holbrook v. State, 772 A.2d 1240 (Md. 
2001); Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191 (Md. 1992); McCray v. State, 501 A.2d 856 
(Md. 1985); Dempsey v. State, 355 A.2d 455 (Md. 1976). 
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also enables those who are affected by the ruling to submit an amicus 
brief, sometimes at the court’s invitation, to protect non-litigants’ 
rights.218 
As explained below, the Fenner court’s sua sponte constitutional 
ruling denying counsel at bail deviated dramatically from conven-
tional appellate practice.  On direct appeal, the Court of Special Ap-
peals rejected the Sixth Amendment claim that the defense never 
raised or argued at trial or preserved for appeal.219  Then, the Court 
of Appeals also ruled on the same constitutional issue, although it 
had not certified it when granting certiorari.220  In reaching that deci-
sion, Maryland’s high court failed to consider a defense or amicus 
brief that could have provided an accused’s perspective.  Indeed, the 
court heard only from one side: the State’s.  Moreover, indigent de-
fendants, as a class, had no input in the decision-making process.  
While an appellate court’s sua sponte power may be invoked to de-
cide an issue neither briefed nor certified, courts are expected to ex-
ercise such discretion in the “most extraordinary”221 circumstances 
only.  Fenner was not the exceptional situation.  In sum, by not provid-
ing notice and ensuring the full participation of the defense and legal 
community, the Fenner court undermined the adversarial process and 
raised a serious question about the ruling’s legitimacy and acceptance 
within legal circles.222 
A. Maryland Appellate Court Practice 
1. Preservation of issues 
In an adversarial system, advocates assume the crucial role and 
responsibility for identifying disputed issues and assisting appellate 
judges in the search for fair and just outcomes.  In appealing a crimi-
nal conviction, defense counsel is duty-bound to target trial rulings 
believed to constitute reversible error because they arguably deprived 
the defendant of a fair trial or otherwise infringed a constitutional or 
statutory right.  Basic to appellate review is the requirement of pres-
ervation; a lawyer must raise and make an adequate record of an issue 
 
 218 MD. R. 8-511. 
 219 See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (granting certiorari 
on the Fifth Amendment Miranda issue and the court’s redacted version of Fenner’s 
statement); see supra note 187. 
 220 See id. 
 221 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199; see infra note 230. 
 222 See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
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at trial, or else the matter is considered waived and non-reviewable on 
appeal.223 
In Fenner’s direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,224 he 
urged reversal of the trial judge’s Fifth Amendment suppression rul-
ing that his lawyer had argued before trial.  Because Fenner’s trial 
lawyer never asserted he had been denied his Sixth Amendment or 
statutory right to counsel at bail, that issue is usually considered 
waived.  Consequently, on appeal, Fenner’s defender had a strong 
basis for believing that he could not raise the constitutional or statu-
tory right to counsel argument.  Nevertheless, the Court of Special 
Appeals proceeded to rule, sua sponte, that bail is not a critical stage 
that requires representation.225  In its ruling, the intermediate appel-
late court never identified the “extraordinary”226 circumstance or ex-
plained how Fenner fell within permissible judicial boundaries for ex-
ercising judicial discretion to address a non-preserved issue.227 
 
 223 See supra note 215.  MD. R. 8-131(a) limits appellate review to issues raised be-
fore the trial court but gives the appellate court discretion to decide non-preserved 
issues “if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and 
delay of another appeal.”  Id.  In Fenner, neither exception applied.  The sua sponte 
ruling affirming the conviction meant that there would not be a second trial, and the 
appellate court’s raising of a separate constitutional ground did not reduce expense 
and delay in the appellate process.  See also Holbrook v. State, 772 A.2d 1240 (Md. 
2001); McCray v. State, 501 A.2d 856 (Md. 1985); Dempsey v. State, 355 A.2d 455 
(Md. 1976). 
 224 In Maryland, a convicted defendant has the right to appeal erroneous trial rul-
ings directly to the Court of Special Appeals.  Wilson v. State, 399 A.2d 256 (Md. 
1979).  If the intermediate court affirms the finding, the defendant may ask the 
Court of Appeals to exercise its discretionary power and grant certiorari review of a 
particular question. 
 225 See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.  See also MD. R. 8-301. 
 226 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199. 
 227 In County Council of Prince George’s County v. Offen, 639 A.2d 1070, 1074 (Md. 
1994), the Court of Appeals stated that there were limited circumstances when an 
appellate court could decide an issue not raised at trial or by the litigants.  The court 
stated: “We have recognized on occasion that an appellate court possesses discretion 
to consider matters that were not relied upon by the trial judge, or perhaps not even 
raised by the parties.  This discretion, however, is not unbridled.” (internal citations 
omitted).  Sua sponte rulings would be appropriate in the following situations: 
(a) to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the atten-
tion of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, 
and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings[; and] 
(b) to prevent the trial of cases in a piecemeal fashion, thus accelerat-
ing the termination of litigation. 
The court went on to recognize a third exception, (c) that “because of important 
public policy considerations, there is a limited category of issues, in addition to juris-
diction, which an appellate court ordinarily will address even though they were not 
raised by a party [including exhaustion of administrative remedies, maybe standing 
of party].”  The court further recognized a fourth exception, (d) where an appellate 
court might raise an issue sua sponte in a situation in which a lower court decided a 
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2. Certification 
Following Fenner’s unsuccessful appeal, the Court of Appeals 
granted certiorari and expanded the disfavored sua sponte practice 
by considering the non-certified Sixth Amendment issue on the mer-
its.  Established practice rules for certiorari review require the high 
court to examine only issues identified in a defendant’s petition and 
to certify questions deemed worthy of further consideration.228  Since 
Fenner’s certiorari petition had not raised the Sixth Amendment is-
sue, the Court of Appeals did not certify that question.  Consistent 
with usual Maryland procedure, the court should have limited review 
to the trial judge’s Fifth Amendment suppression ruling.229  Certiorari 
review is usually restricted to certified issues, although practice rules 
permit the high court’s intervention in “‘a very limited number of cir-
cumstances [that] have been treated as “extraordinary.”’”230  While 
court decisions delineate a wide range of recognized exceptions to 
the certification rule, none seemingly justified the Fenner court’s sua 
sponte action.231  Indeed, as explained below, the Court of Appeals’ 
 
case correctly but reached its result through faulty analysis.  Id. at 1075 (internal cita-
tions omitted).  None of these exceptions would have applied in Fenner: (a) and (b) 
pertain to a non-existent retrial and (d) is irrelevant since the lower court had not 
ruled on the Sixth Amendment issue.  The court never explained or justified its rul-
ing on (c)’s broad public policy exception.  See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 
1020 (Md. 2004). 
 228 MD. R. 8-131(b) states: 
Unless otherwise provided by the order granting the writ of certiorari, 
in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of Special Appeals . . . 
the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that has 
been raised in the petition for certiorari or any cross-petition and that 
has been preserved for review by the Court of Appeals. 
Id.; see also Jones v. State, 745 A.2d 396 (Md. 2000); Wynn v. State, 718 A.2d 588 (Md. 
1998); McMorris v. State, 355 A.2d 438 (Md. 1976). 
 229 Court of Special Appeals’ rulings are reviewable only if the question is “raised 
in the petition for certiorari.”  MD. R. 8-131(b).  See supra note 178.  Fenner raised 
only the Fifth, not the Sixth, Amendment issue.  See supra note 12. 
 230 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (alteration in original) (quoting Prof’l Staff Nurses v. 
Dimensions Health Corp., 695 A.2d 158, 161 (Md. 1997)).  See also McMorris, 355 
A.2d at 443 n.4 (“[E]xcept in most extraordinary circumstances, we will consider on 
an appeal resulting from a grant of a writ of certiorari only those questions raised in 
the petition and matters relevant to those questions . . . .” (quoting Walston v. Sun 
Cab Co., Inc., 298 A.2d 391, 396 (Md. 1973)).  See supra text accompanying note 221. 
 231 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has considered “extraordinary circum-
stances” to include consideration of: 
[a] jurisdictional questions, [b] whether a trial court’s order was ap-
pealable, [c] a non-constitutional issue that will enable the Court to 
avoid a constitutional question presented, [d] whether the case has be-
come moot, [e] the question whether the trial court has either failed to 
render a particular type of judgment required in the action . . . or has 
rendered a type of judgment that is beyond the court’s authority, [f] 
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Sixth Amendment decision virtually turned one of the “most extraor-
dinary” exceptions on its head.232 
Appellate courts’ rationale for disfavoring sua sponte rulings is 
clear.  Deciding “new” issues not briefed and fully argued is inconsis-
tent with guaranteeing fundamental due process and fairness to liti-
gants and interested parties.233  Appellate review seeks to provide no-
tice and a fair opportunity for everyone who has an interest in the 
matter, or who may be affected by the decision, to speak and be 
heard.  Guaranteeing such due process is essential to the “integrity”234 
of a system that relies on lawyers’ prepared argument and competing 
positions. 
In Fenner, certification had additional meaning.  Since the Court 
of Special Appeals’ unreported denial of counsel opinion had been 
unpublished, the outside legal community was unaware of the sweep-
ing decision and could not be expected to intervene by submitting an 
amicus brief.  Certification was the only means of alerting interested 
 
state government sovereign immunity under Maryland law, and [g] 
where the failure of the Court to consider an issue would result in the 
violation of an important public policy, such as the requirement that 
administrative remedies be exhausted. 
State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 602, 616 (Md. 1996) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (footnotes 
and citations omitted).  Exceptions (a), (b), (d), (e) and (f) are irrelevant, (g) is too 
broad and its applicability is not explained, and (c) is completely opposite the Fenner 
court’s approach. 
 232 The Fenner court never considered the relevant Public Defender Act that could 
have justified ruling sua sponte on statutory grounds to avoid the constitutional issue.  
See infra at 287–94.  Instead, the court reached out to decide the constitutional Sixth 
Amendment issue and neglected the statutory argument.  See Fenner v. State (Fenner 
IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1030 (Md. 2004). 
 233 Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte 
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245, 253–63 (2002) (citing Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160, 186 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring)).  Milani and Smith 
state: 
Allowing a party to submit briefs and arguments on what the party be-
lieves to be the issues, but denying that party the opportunity to be 
heard on the issue the court deems dispositive, is akin to granting citi-
zens free speech but barring them from speaking on issues of public 
concern.  In both situations, the exception renders the right meaning-
less. 
Id. at 268–69; see also Barry Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive 
Litigants of an Opportunity to be Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1253 (2002) (arguing 
against sua sponte decisions and urging court notification to the parties within an 
adversarial system); Chicago Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673 (1994) (criticizing the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for deciding issues not briefed and 
arguing that the circuit court should respect the parties’ framing of the issue while 
fulfilling its obligation to do justice). 
 234 Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 245, 247. 
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parties about the potential wide-ranging impact of the intermediate 
court’s ruling.  Denying notice, on the other hand, reveals the limited 
value placed on amicus participation during the judicial decision-
making process. 
3. Critiquing Appellate Courts’ Sua Sponte Practice 
When appellate courts deviate from established adversarial 
process and exercise their judicial discretion to decide broad issues 
sua sponte, they are vulnerable to deserved criticism.  Judges and 
commentators join in criticizing such courts for becoming “self-
directed boards of legal inquiry,”235 and for assuming an authoritarian 
model of decision-making, rather than exhibiting a commitment to 
judicial “neutrality and passivity.”236  An appellate court’s activism and 
circumvention of established procedure is not trivial.  As Supreme 
Court Justice Scalia explained: “The rule that points not argued will 
not be considered is more than just a prudential rule of convenience; 
its observance, at least in the vast majority of cases, distinguishes our 
adversary system of justice from the inquisitorial one.”237  Within such 
a system, an appellate court that endorses the non-adversarial, unilat-
eral judicial model of decision-making typically silences one of the 
parties or, at best, treats the litigant as a minor actor.  When a court 
takes such action, it should provide the rationale for exercising sua 
sponte power so as to overcome the appearance of having prejudged 
or preferred an outcome, a troubling image for a judiciary bent on 
being viewed as the quintessential impartial arbiter. 
Even then, an activist court’s readiness to decide a question not 
briefed or fully argued may subject the ruling to considerable skepti-
cism and doubt.  Understandably, litigants and the public are less 
 
 235 Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J.) (“The prem-
ise of our adversarial system is that appellate courts do not sit as self-directed boards 
of legal inquiry and research, but essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented 
and argued by the parties before them.”). 
 236 Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 279, 277–82 (noting that the basic principle 
of the adversarial system is a “neutral and passive” decision-maker); STEPHAN 
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO 
ADJUDICATION 2 (1988) (“[N]eutrality and passivity are essential not only to ensure 
an evenhanded consideration of each case but also to convince society at large that 
the judicial system is trustworthy.”). 
 237 United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).  In 
another concurring opinion, Justice Scalia recognized that “there are times when 
prudence dictates the contrary” and when an appellate court should rule on its own.  
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 464 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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willing to accept a judicial holding that has ignored their viewpoint 
than one that invited them to share knowledge and perspective.238 
Additionally, the missing input and perspective from adversaries 
and affected parties makes a court more susceptible to deciding a 
case wrongly.239  Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Richard Posner de-
scribed the increased judicial risk as “taking a leap into the un-
known.”240  Other commentators condemn a practice whereby an ap-
pellate court reaches decisions without hearing from the parties most 
affected, charging that it is “both illegal and imprudent for appellate 
courts to ‘play God.’”241  These commentators urge courts to follow 
the adversarial process in an effort to reduce the possibility that re-
viewing judges will be uninformed and will reach decisions by relying 
on “assumption[s] that simply [are] incorrect and w[ere] not 
raised.”242  The Fenner court, for instance, seemed less troubled about 
 
 238 Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 282–86.  Milani and Smith argue that it is 
important to give the losing party the opportunity to be heard to “enhance the 
chances that litigants and society will believe that the losing party was given a fair op-
portunity to present his case.”  Id. at 286.  The authors contend that denying this 
fundamental right is inconsistent with due process and with the adversarial system.  
Id. 
 239 Id. at 268, 271 (“One cannot assume that a party, who has a vested interest in 
the outcome of the matter, will not be able to shed additional light on the issue and 
assist the court in analyzing the issue completely.”).  Professor Vestal recognized that 
“there is at least a possibility that other facts or other authorities might have been 
presented which might have changed the court’s attitude on the matter.  But this 
opportunity is not given to the losing party.”  Allen D. Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration 
in Appellate Review, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 477, 493 (1959). 
 240 Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 876 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissent-
ing).  An American Bar Association Report concluded that it is “[o]nly when [a 
judge] has had the benefit of intelligent and vigorous advocacy on both sides can he 
[or she] feel fully confident of his [or her] decision.”  Milani & Smith, supra note 
233, at 275.  In Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1999), the court de-
clared: “Providing the adversely affected party with notice and an opportunity to be 
heard plays an important role in establishing the fairness and reliability of the order.  
It avoids the risk that the court may overlook valid answers to its perception of de-
fects in the plaintiff’s [prosecution’s] case.”  Id. at 113. 
 241 Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 252. 
 242 Id. at 245 n.1 (quoting THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: 
INFORMATION GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 122 (1978)).  Milani and Smith 
refer to an anonymous appellate judge who explained to an author his reasons for 
opposing sua sponte rulings: 
We don’t know enough about them.  You’re playing God then because you 
haven’t had the benefit of the lawyers, the judge below, or the clients, or the evi-
dence.  You’re just playing God without a record, and you have to as-
sume a certain competence in your counsel. . . . I’m loath to do it.  I 
have done it, I guess I really don’t like to do it because it’s too danger-
ous.  There’s nothing worse than a lawyer being beaten by an assump-
tion that simply is incorrect and wasn’t raised. 
Id. 
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denying Fenner counsel or Miranda advisements because it “as-
sumed” he had spoken before a sitting judge, in open court, where 
the public and impartial observers were present.243  Had a knowing 
advocate challenged these wishful assumptions and explained that 
indigent defendants, like Fenner, remain in jail and “appear” 
through video broadcast only, the Court of Appeals might have been 
hard-pressed to overlook counsel’s importance.244 
The force and legitimacy of criticism against appellate courts’ ac-
tivism is exemplified by Fenner, where the sua sponte holding de-
prived other similarly situated defendants of the same constitutional 
right to counsel without an opportunity to present argument.245  At 
these moments, an appellate court must control any activist impulses 
to abandon the adversarial process and insist upon “a vigorous de-
fense,” as well as a “vigorous prosecution.”246  To do otherwise and 
rule without hearing from both sides, and without protecting the 
class of indigent defendants, jeopardizes that court’s reputation and 
respect within the legal community.  In 1993, Justice Souter recog-
nized the institutional danger of an appellate court deciding a consti-
tutional issue without ensuring equal adversarial participation when 
the Justice observed that a “constitutional rule announced sua sponte 
is entitled to less deference than one addressed on full briefing and 
 
 243 See Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004). 
 244 Professor Fuller captured the importance of legal advocacy: 
[B]efore a judge can gauge the full force of an argument, it must be 
presented to him with partisan zeal by one not subject to the con-
straints of the judicial office.  The judge cannot know how strong an 
argument is until he has heard it from the lips of one who has dedi-
cated all the powers of his [and her] mind to its formulation. 
Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 31 (Harold J. Berman 
ed., 1976). 
 245 In a concurring opinion in In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045, 812 A.2d 
271, 284 (Md. 2002) (Wilner, J., concurring), Judge Wilner criticized the court for 
ruling on a constitutional due process issue when the case could have been resolved 
on statutory grounds: 
The Court reaches out to decide a Constitutional question that it need 
not decide . . . and, in so doing, ignores the long-held rule that we do 
not decide Constitutional issues when it is not necessary to do so.   
     The violation of this rather bedrock principle of appellate review 
and restraint would be bad enough if the ruling were correct; here, it is 
particularly egregious because the ruling is dead wrong. 
Id. 
 246 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 572–
73 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 419 (1978)). 
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argument.”247  Justice Souter cautioned appellate courts to refrain 
from sua sponte decision-making because he feared that the legal 
community would give less import to a broad “rule of law unnecessary 
to the outcome of a case, especially one not put into play by the par-
ties.”248  The Justice noted that courts that engage in this brand of ju-
dicial activism produce “the sort of ‘dicta . . . which may be followed 
if sufficiently persuasive but which are not controlling.’”249 
Justice Souter’s acknowledgement of advocates’ role captured 
the essence of the adversarial appellate process.  Had the Fenner court 
invited defense lawyers’ input and participation, it may have reached 
a different outcome that recognized an indigent defendant’s statu-
tory right250 to counsel at the “critical” bail stage.  Unquestionably, the 
Court of Appeals would have silenced criticism for not explaining its 
procedural irregularities.  Instead, the court went forward and de-
cided a non-preserved, non-certified issue “not put into play by the 
parties”251 or argued below.  The court failed to insist upon a “vigor-
ous defense;”252 rather, the court showed no interest in commanding 
Fenner to respond or in inviting the outside community to partici-
pate and help protect the interest of indigent defendants.  Within 
this skewed context, the court’s ultimate outcome and denial of 
counsel was predictable. 
More surprising, the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicted 
with established Maryland appellate practice.  Appellate courts are 
required to avoid ruling on a constitutional question when they are 
able to decide the case on non-constitutional grounds.253  As de-
scribed in Part IV.B of this Article, Fenner had a solid statutory claim 
to a right to counsel at bail, one that the court previously recognized 
 
 247 Id.  In Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme 
Court overruled its prior holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), that had re-
stricted federal civil rights § 1983 liability to individuals, not municipalities.  Monell, 
436 U.S. at 663.  Justice Powell believed overruling Monroe was appropriate, in part 
because the issues in Monroe had “never actually [been] briefed or argued.”  Id. at 
708 (Powell, J., concurring).  Such decisions, said Justice Powell, “may be accorded 
less weight” and that “less deference [is owed] to a decision that was rendered with-
out benefit of a full airing of all the relevant considerations.”  Id. at 709 n.6. 
 248 City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
 249 Id. (quoting Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627 (1935)). 
 250 See infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text. 
 251 City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572–73 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment). 
 252 See id. 
 253 McCarter v. State, 770 A.2d 195, 199 (Md. 2001); State v. Broberg, 677 A.2d 
602, 604, 612 (Md. 1996) (avoiding a sweeping decision and resolving the case on 
narrow grounds affecting the parties only). 
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and considered sufficiently weighty to explain why it was proper to as-
sert sua sponte or “on its own.”254  By not addressing this argument, 
and by invoking its rare sua sponte power to the detriment of indi-
gent defendants, the Fenner court abused judicial discretion.255  Simply 
stated, both the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the Court of 
Special Appeals were “unnecessary to the outcome;”256 the courts al-
ready rejected Fenner’s Fifth Amendment argument for non-
admissibility and there was no justifiable reason to decide the Sixth 
Amendment issue. 
Why then did the Court of Appeals reach for constitutional 
questions not raised in Fenner’s certiorari petition, contrary to estab-
lished Maryland policy and procedure?257  What “most extraordinary 
circumstance”258 justified the court’s proactive ruling that extended 
certiorari review to issues not argued at trial or certified by the high 
court?  The court did not answer or explain, leaving the legal com-
munity to speculate on its reasons.259 
Perhaps most perplexingly, the Court of Appeals omitted men-
tion of McCarter v. State,260 where the high court unanimously held 
that the Maryland Public Defender Act261 required defenders to rep-
resent indigent defendants at the initial appearance and at “all 
 
 254 See infra Part IV.B. 
 255 Milani & Smith, supra note 233, at 287–90. 
 256 City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 572 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment); see supra note 215 (quoting Maryland’s preservation rule, which al-
lows non-preserved issues to be decided on appeal “if necessary or desirable to guide 
the trial court”). 
 257 Maryland Rule 8-131(b)(1) states that “[u]nless otherwise provided by the or-
der granting the writ of certiorari, in reviewing a decision rendered by the Court of 
Special Appeals . . . the Court of Appeals ordinarily will consider only an issue that 
has been raised in the petition for certiorari . . . .” 
 258 See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text. 
 259 The Court of Appeals could have believed that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel was inextricably linked to Fenner’s Fifth Amendment Miranda right to con-
fer with counsel before waiving his privilege against self-incrimination, but these are 
separate and independent arguments.  See supra notes 142–52 and accompanying 
text.  The court might have wanted to send a clear message that it opposed extend-
ing Gideon to other “critical” stages of a criminal proceeding, as well as to non-
criminal matters.  But this should have encouraged the court to invite, not to pre-
vent, the defense bar’s participation and provides no answer as to why the high court 
omitted McCarter’s statutory right to counsel.  By ruling as it did, the court may have 
reopened an old and painful wound, showing insensitivity and hostility to accused 
indigent defendants’ right to counsel.  See infra notes 297–312 and accompanying 
text. 
 260 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001). 
 261 MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, §§ 1–14 (Michie 2003). 
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stages” of a criminal proceeding.262  McCarter, too, was a sua sponte 
right to counsel decision, but one where the issue had been pre-
served and certified, and where the court explained intervention was 
justified to avoid ruling upon an extraneous constitutional issue.263  
The absence of McCarter is a most disturbing feature of the Fenner 
court’s ruling and demonstrates what likely can be expected to occur 
when a court decides a case without advocates. 
B. McCarter v. State264 
When Antwone Paris McCarter first appeared in the District 
Court for Wicomico County, Maryland, after being charged with pos-
session of marijuana and paraphernalia, he had not retained a law-
yer.265  Questioned by the district court judge, McCarter indicated 
that he wanted to be tried by a judge and expressly waived his consti-
tutional right to a trial by jury.266  When McCarter returned for trial 
the following month, he had a public defender at his side.267  The de-
fender contended that McCarter’s jury waiver was not legally bind-
ing.268  McCarter, the defender contended, was entitled to consult 
with an attorney before making the crucial decision regarding 
whether to be tried by a jury or a judge.269  The defender argued that 
the choice of “mode of trial is a critical stage of the proceedings.”270  
The court rejected the argument,271 and McCarter renewed his mo-
tion before the trial judge, who also rejected his constitutional claim 
and concluded that his waiver decision had been given “knowingly 
 
 262 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 200.  MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A, section 4(d) states that: 
Representation by the Office of the Public defender, or by an attorney 
appointed by the Office of the Public defender, shall extend to all stages 
in the proceedings, including custody, interrogation, preliminary hearing, 
arraignment, trial . . . and appeal, if any, and shall continue until the 
final disposition of the cause, or until the assigned attorney is relieved 
by the Public Defender or by order of the court in which the cause is 
pending. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 263 See infra notes 282–85. 
 264 770 A.2d 195 (Md. 2001). 
 265 Id. at 197.  McCarter requested a jury trial in the district court, and his case was 
then transferred to the circuit court.  Id. at 196. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id. at 198. 
 268 Id. 
 269 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198. 
 270 Id. 
 271 Id. 
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and voluntarily.”272  At McCarter’s bench trial, the judge convicted 
him of drug possession and issued a ninety-day sentence.273 
McCarter appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Ap-
peals.274  Before it could consider McCarter’s right to counsel argu-
ment, however, Maryland’s highest court exercised its unique review-
ing powers and “issued a writ of certiorari on its own motion.”275  The 
Court of Appeals’ decision to bypass the intermediate appellate court 
must have surprised the adversaries, who now prepared to argue be-
fore the high court whether the constitutional right to counsel applied 
to the initial appearance.  This was, after all, the “sole issue debated 
by the parties on this appeal”276 and certified for certiorari review.277 
Yet the Court of Appeals took a second unexpected approach 
that the parties could not have anticipated.  It avoided ruling on the 
constitutional issue altogether and introduced a legal argument the 
defense had not raised: the public defender’s statutory duty to repre-
sent indigent defendants at the initial appearance.278  “We issued a 
writ of certiorari in this criminal case to determine whether a defen-
dant has a right to counsel at an initial appearance, under Maryland 
Rule 4-213(c), at which time the defendant purported to waive his 
right to a jury trial.”279  Maryland’s Public Defender Act, said the 
court, could resolve the case.280  The high court explained its reason-
ing for taking the “extraordinary”281 measure of using its sua sponte 
power: “This Court adheres to the established principle that a court 
will not decide a constitutional issue when a case can properly be dis-
 
 272 Id. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198 (citing McCarter v. State, 749 A.2d 172 (Md. 2000)).  
Maryland appellate practice rules permit the Court of Appeals to seize jurisdiction as 
a matter of judicial discretion: “In a case or proceeding described in this section, the 
Court of Appeals also may issue the writ of certiorari on its own motion.”  MD. CODE 
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC., § 12–201 (Michie 2002); see also Walston v. Sun Cab Co., Inc., 
298 A.2d 391, 395 (Md. 1973) (granting certiorari “when review and determination 
by [the Court of Appeals] appears to be ‘desirable and in the public interest.’”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 276 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 198. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 196. 
 279 Id.  MD. R. 4-213(2) provides that “the judicial officer shall advise the defen-
dant that if the defendant appears for trial without counsel, the court could deter-
mine that the defendant waived counsel and proceed to trial with the defendant un-
represented by counsel.” 
 280 See McCarter, 770 A.2d at 196. 
 281 Id. at 199. 
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posed of on a non-constitutional ground.”282  McCarter’s Sixth 
Amendment contention that he was entitled to counsel at his initial 
appearance fell within this “established principle” and represented 
“one of ‘a very limited number of circumstances’”283 where the high 
court’s interest in resolving a case on statutory, rather than constitu-
tional, grounds trumped the usual limitations of certiorari review.284  
“Appellate policy,” declared the court, mandates abstention from 
“unnecessary . . .  constitutional issues,”285 such as McCarter’s claim 
that the initial appearance was a critical stage.  Concluding that 
McCarter had a statutory right to counsel when he first appeared in 
court, the Court of Appeals held that he had been entitled to counsel 
at his initial appearance and, therefore, could not have waived his 
right to a jury trial in the lawyer’s absence.286 
Had Fenner preserved the right to counsel issue on appeal, the 
McCarter court’s legal analysis would have been highly relevant to his 
appearance at the bail proceeding.  As the McCarter court explained, 
the defender’s statutory duty to represent indigent defendants “at all 
stages in the proceedings”287 is “significantly broader than the consti-
tutional right to counsel.”288  The court examined the statute and its 
explicit reference to representation at “arraignment” to determine 
whether McCarter’s “initial court appearance” fell within the statute’s 
scope.289  The court concluded that legislators used the terms, “ar-
raignment” and “initial appearance,” interchangeably.290  But instead 
of confining the ruling to a technical, statutory construction, the 
court offered a sweeping right to counsel perspective.291  Returning to 
the Defender Act’s broad language that guaranteed representation at 
“all stages,” the Court of Appeals agreed that, “‘All’ means ‘all’ and it 
 
 282 Id. (citations omitted).  In State v. Raithel, 404 A.2d 264, 267 (Md. 1979), the 
court decided the case on evidentiary, rather than Fifth Amendment, grounds and 
stated: “[N]othing is better settled than the principle that courts should not decide 
constitutional issues unnecessarily.”  Id. 
 283 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 199 (quoting Prof’l Staff Nurses v. Dimensions Health 
Corp., 695 A.2d 158, 161 (Md. 1997)). 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Id. 
 287 See supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
 288 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 200 (quoting State v. Flansburg, 694 A.2d 462, 465 (Md. 
1997)). 
 289 Id. at 200–01.  The State contended that McCarter’s initial appearance was not 
an arraignment because McCarter had not entered a plea.  Id. at 201.  The Court of 
Appeals noted that McCarter pled not guilty.  Id. 
 290 Id. 
 291 McCarter, 770 A.2d at 201. 
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encompasses [McCarter’s initial appearance in the district court] re-
gardless of its categorization.”292  The Public Defender Act’s specific 
examples of when representation is mandated, from custody to ar-
raignment and through trial, were “for purposes of illustration 
only.”293  An accused’s right to counsel, concluded the high court, in-
cludes a defendant’s initial appearance and presumably extends to 
“all” subsequent stages, including bail review hearings.294 
Like the Fenner court, the McCarter court took the unusual action 
of ruling sua sponte in a case concerned with indigent defendants’ 
right to counsel.  Procedurally and substantively, however, the differ-
ences between the two sua sponte Court of Appeals holdings could 
not be greater.  In McCarter, the court had certified a right to counsel 
issue that had been presented to the trial judge and preserved for 
appeal.295  The court explained the reason for ruling sua sponte; it 
had relied on well-settled doctrine for avoiding a constitutional issue 
by invoking a statutory argument the parties had not raised.  Substan-
tively, McCarter sought to enforce indigents’ right to counsel at the 
initial court appearance.  In Fenner, the court never articulated the 
basis for ruling sua sponte and proactively choosing to reach a consti-
tutional issue that had not been preserved, certified or briefed.  Sub-
stantively, the court denied indigents a constitutional right to counsel 
at bail and did not consider a statutory holding that appeared to 
guarantee representation.   
What accounted for this difference?  McCarter would have pro-
vided strong support for Fenner and other indigent defendants’ 
claim to counsel at bail and to suppression of his statement.  But the 
Fenner court overlooked McCarter, contrary to a “bedrock principle of 
appellate review:”296 do not rule on a constitutional issue when a case 
may be decided on statutory grounds. 
Both McCarter and Fenner are important pieces in Maryland’s 
right to counsel mosaic.  Part V of this Article provides additional 
context for appreciating what happened in McCarter and Fenner. 
 
 292 Id. 
 293 Id.; see infra note 316 and accompanying text. 
 294 See McCarter, 770 A.2d at 201. 
 295 See id. at 196. 
 296 See supra note 245 (providing quote of Court of Appeals Judge Wilner’s con-
curring opinion in In Re Adoption/Guardianship No. 6Z000045, 812 A.2d 271, 284 
(Md. 2002)). 
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V. INDIGENTS’ RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT BAIL  
A. The Historic Denial of Representation at Trial 
The reasoning in McCarter was not the only piece of legal analysis 
missing from the Fenner opinion.  The court’s ruling against indi-
gents’ constitutional right to counsel at bail also avoided a historic 
context; it never placed Fenner within Maryland’s tortured develop-
ment of indigents’ right to counsel.  Doing so would have helped ex-
plain the court’s sua sponte ruling. 
During most of Maryland’s history, indigent defendants charged 
with serious felony and misdemeanor crimes had no right to an as-
signed defense lawyer and had no choice but to defend themselves at 
trial.297  Typically, unrepresented defendants routinely waived a jury 
trial.298  In Maryland courtrooms, it was a common sight to see an ac-
cused attempting to cross examine and question one’s own witnesses 
before the presiding judge.299 
In the 1930’s, two United States Supreme Court constitutional 
rulings momentarily shifted the national momentum toward extend-
ing the right to counsel in state and federal prosecutions.  In Powell v. 
Alabama,300 the Supreme Court recognized that state defendants fac-
ing a capital charge had a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim 
to assigned counsel.301  Several years later in Johnson v. Zerbst,302 the 
 
 297 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942). 
 298 Id. at 472 (1942) (“[I]n Maryland the usual practice is for the defendant to 
waive a trial by jury.”). 
 299 See id.  In the Supreme Court’s review of Betts’ habeas corpus petition, Justice 
Roberts noted that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge Bond, defended 
the practice of trial without counsel before a judge, rather than a jury: “Certainly my 
own experience in criminal trials over which I have presided (over 2000, as I estimate 
it), has demonstrated to me that there are fair trials without counsel employed for 
the prisoners.”  Id. at 472 n.31 (quoting Chief Judge Bond’s opinion denying the re-
lief requested in Betts’ state petition for a writ of habeas corpus ). 
 300 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 301 Id.  In Powell, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction of nine African 
American defendants who had been charged with raping two white women because 
the defendants did not know their attorney’s identity until the day of trial.  Id. at 73.  
Although the Court found that counsel’s pretrial appointment was “vital and impera-
tive” to protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial, the Court declined to extend its 
ruling to every state capital and felony prosecution.  Id. at 71.  The Court explained: 
All that it is necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capi-
tal case, where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is inca-
pable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance, fee-
ble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, 
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary req-
uisite of due process of law . . . . 
Id. 
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Court held that the Sixth Amendment also guaranteed indigent de-
fendants the right to counsel in federal felony prosecutions.303  How-
ever the momentum subsided five years later in Betts v. Brady,304 when 
the Supreme Court rejected a Maryland habeas petitioner’s due 
process argument305 and refused to extend the constitutional right to 
counsel in state felony prosecutions.306 
In Betts, the Supreme Court upheld Maryland’s “usual prac-
tice”307 of permitting a defendant’s self-representation at a felony trial 
where the accused was a person “of ordinary intelligence,” who was 
“not wholly unfamiliar with criminal procedure.”308  Because Mary-
land was typical of the majority of states that refused to assign counsel 
in a felony prosecution,309 the Supreme Court measured the practice 
 
 302 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
 303 Id.  In Zerbst, the habeas petitioner, a United States Marine, was tried without 
counsel and convicted in federal court for having feloniously passed and uttered 
counterfeit money.  Id. at 459–60.  The Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel guaranteed representation “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions . . . to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty.”  Id. at 462.  
Relying on Powell, the Court declared that the “right to be heard would be, in many 
cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”  Id. at 
463. 
 304 316 U.S. 455 (1942).  Smith Betts, indicted for robbery and lacking funds, 
asked the trial judge to assign counsel.  Id. at 456–57.  The judge refused, stating that 
indigent defendants were entitled to legal representation only when the charge was 
murder or rape.  Id. at 457.  Betts opted for a bench trial.  Id.  He cross-examined 
prosecution witnesses and questioned his own alibi witnesses.  Id.  The trial judge 
convicted Betts and sentenced him to eight years imprisonment.  Id. 
 305 Betts contended that the denial of counsel was “shocking to the universal sense 
of justice” and violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and a fair 
trial.  See Betts, 316 U.S. at 462. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 472 (referring to the Maryland practice of conducting bench trials, not 
jury trials, for unrepresented defendants). 
 308 Id. Betts, 43-years old, was previously convicted and sentenced in a larceny 
prosecution.  Id.  Dissenting, Justice Black described Betts as “a farm hand, out of a 
job and on relief,” adding that “[i]t is clear from his examination of witnesses that he 
was a man of little education.”  Id. at 474 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 309 The 6-3 Betts majority referred to the “great majority of the states” that did not 
consider counsel as a “fundamental right, essential to a fair trial.”  Id. at 471 (major-
ity opinion).  The opinion identified twenty-six states which did not guarantee a law-
yer in every felony case.  Many of these states assigned counsel in capital and serious 
or “grave” felony crimes or left it to a judge’s discretion.  Nearly half the states, 
twenty-one altogether, required appointment “in all cases.”  Betts, 316 U.S. at 470.  
Virginia, the forty-eighth state, had no constitutional provision requiring a lawyer’s 
assistance in a criminal case.  Id. at 467.  The three dissenting Justices analyzed the 
same data and concluded that thirty-five states had a “clear legal requirement or an 
established practice” for assigning counsel in serious felonies that they believed enti-
tled Betts to a defender on the charge of robbery.  Id. at 477 n.2 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). 
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of denying counsel to accused indigents against the constitutional 
commands of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.310  The Betts 
Court concluded that Maryland’s practice of not assigning counsel to 
accused felons and of conducting trials without juries were not “of-
fensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness.”311  For the 
next two decades, Maryland continued its practice of prosecuting un-
represented accused felons, as long as a trial judge concluded that 
they were not “at a serious disadvantage by reason of the lack of 
counsel,” or so “handicapped” or “helpless” when defending them-
selves before a judge.312 
In 1963, states’ criminal defense systems and access to justice for 
indigent defendants changed dramatically.  That year, in Gideon v. 
Wainwright,313 the Supreme Court gave meaning to the constitutional 
right to counsel at a felony trial for “any person haled into court, who 
is too poor to hire a lawyer.”314  Gideon’s recognition that the Sixth 
Amendment’s right to counsel was incorporated into the Fourteenth 
Amendment concept of due process fundamentally altered the legal 
landscape for indigent defendants in state courts.  Within the next 
decade, the guarantee of counsel also would apply to misdemeanors 
and to “critical”315 pretrial stages of a criminal proceeding. 
Maryland responded to Gideon by revamping its indigent defense 
system and becoming one of a relatively few states to move to a public 
defender system.  The 1970 Public Defender Act acknowledged the 
state’s commitment to Gideon’s promise by guaranteeing counsel “at 
 
 310 See id. at 461–65 (majority opinion).  The Court conducted a historic analysis 
of the constitutions of the original thirteen states and determined that the con-
straints imposed by the Sixth Amendment only apply to federal trials but that the 
“[A]mendment lays down no rule for the conduct of the states.”  Id. at 465. 
 311 Id. at 473.  The majority concluded that “[a]t the least, such a construction by 
state courts and legislators cannot be said to lack a reasonable basis.”  Betts, 316 U.S. 
at 466.  The majority expressed concern that mandating counsel in every felony 
prosecution “straight-jacketed” states to appoint a lawyer when it was not necessary.  
Id. at 472.  The Court favored states taking a diverse approach.  Maryland’s “much 
more informal” bench trial, for instance, had “obvious” advantages: “[T]he judge can 
much better control the course of the trial and is in a better position to see impartial 
justice done than when the formalities of a jury trial are involved.”  Id.  Dissenting, 
Justice Black reached a different conclusion and declared that denying counsel to 
Betts and other indigent defendants “has long been regarded as shocking to the 
‘universal sense of justice’ throughout this country.”  Id. at 476 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 312 Id. at 472–73 (majority opinion). 
 313 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 314 Id. at 344. 
 315 See infra note 342. 
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all stages in the [criminal] proceeding.”316  Implementation of the 
legislation, however, did not change the practice of non-
representation at most Maryland bail and pretrial release proceed-
ings.  At the time when McCarter was decided, nine of Maryland’s 
twelve judicial districts still did not provide legal representation at an 
accused’s initial appearance or at bail reviews.317  The McCarter court’s 
sua sponte ruling suggests that the Court of Appeals of Maryland took 
advantage of the opportunity to address the reality of Maryland de-
fendants appearing without defenders.318 
Three years later, however, in deciding against Fenner’s claim to 
representation at bail, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reverted to 
the past practice of diminishing counsel’s importance.  Its sua sponte 
Sixth Amendment ruling failed to reference Gideon or the post-Gideon 
period in which Maryland law embraced legal representation “at all 
stages in the [criminal] proceeding.”319  The court avoided mention 
of the public defender’s duty of representation that would have pro-
tected Fenner from speaking and making his inculpatory statement. 
The Supreme Court’s conflicting decisions in Betts and Gideon 
provide context for understanding Fenner’s and McCarter’s opposite 
placement within Maryland’s right to counsel jurisprudence.  
McCarter is well situated within the expanded philosophy of guaran-
teeing counsel to indigent defendants.  With Maryland’s Public De-
fender Act, the legislature acknowledged that counsel was needed to 
 
 316 MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A § 4(a) (Supp. 2005).  Section 1 of the Public De-
fender Act indicates that it is “the policy of the State of Maryland to . . . assure effec-
tive assistance and continuity of counsel to indigent accused taken into custody . . . in 
criminal and juvenile proceedings . . . and to authorize the Office of Public Defender 
to administer and assure enforcement” of the statute.  Id. § 1.  Section 4 refers to the 
“primary duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation for any indi-
gent defendant eligible for services,” and specifies particular proceedings “where 
possible incarceration . . . may result.”  Id. § 4. 
 317 Maryland’s statewide public defender system does not provide uniform repre-
sentation at bail proceedings.  In 1998, only public defenders in Harford and Mont-
gomery counties represented indigent defendants at bail review hearings.  Colbert, 
Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1732 n.57. 
 318 The high court was aware of legislative efforts to extend representation at bail 
statewide.  During the preceding 1999 and 2000 legislative sessions, the Chief Judge 
of the Court of Appeals, Robert Bell, and the criminal justice community strongly 
supported legislation that would have guaranteed public defender representation at 
bail.  Id. at 1767–69 nn.142–50.  In 1999, the bill was narrowly defeated through the 
lobbying efforts of the powerful bail bond industry.  Id. at 1767.  In 2000, the Senate 
overwhelmingly passed the bill but the Chair of the House judiciary committee never 
permitted the bill to come to a vote.  Id. at 1768–69 & nn. 153–54.  By construing the 
Public Defender Act to mandate representation at the initial stage, the McCarter 
court addressed the issue directly and made new legislation unnecessary. 
 319 MD. CODE ANN., art. 27A § 4(a) (Supp. 2005). 
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advocate for “men of intelligence,” as well as “for the ignorant and 
illiterate [and] those of feeble instinct.”320  Maryland’s statutory guar-
antee of counsel “at all stages” fits easily within Gideon’s “noble 
ideal.”321  Fenner, on the other hand, belongs on the limited side of 
Maryland’s constitutional right to counsel jurisprudence alongside 
Betts, whose self-defense at a felony trial was not considered “offensive 
to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness.”322  In this re-
stricted realm, an appellate court is less concerned with an accused’s 
procedural guarantees of a fair trial, even when the unrepresented 
accused provides substantial assistance to the prosecution’s proof of 
guilt at his trial. 
Maryland’s historic right to counsel trajectory may be similar to 
the path in other states that have failed to guarantee representation 
to accused indigents.  Its legacy of denying counsel at bail proceed-
ings coincide with the “great majority” of states that also refuse to 
provide counsel at bail proceedings.  As Part V.B of this Article de-
scribes, most state and local courts still refuse to acknowledge the “in-
tricate, complex and mysterious”323 world that Donald Fenner and 
other defendants enter when they appear alone at their initial ap-
pearance and speak in response to a judicial officer’s inquiry.  Unless 
state judiciaries are prepared to revisit their historic perspective, they 
are likely to follow Fenner’s reasoning and find nothing objectionable 
about admitting at trial statements uttered by an unrepresented de-
fendant at a bail proceeding. 
B. The National Implications of Fenner 
Throughout the country, many indigents first experience a 
state’s criminal justice system without a lawyer.324  When they appear 
 
 320 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 321 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). 
 322 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).  The Court added that “while want of 
counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental 
fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] amendment embodies an inexorable 
command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and 
justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.”  Id. 
 323 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).  See supra notes 302–03. 
 324 See Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–24. 
[I]n a country that prides itself on guaranteeing poor people equal ac-
cess to justice, eighteen states do not provide lawyers at this initial pro-
ceeding anywhere within their borders. The remaining twenty-four 
states decline to provide representation at bail in all but a few of their 
counties.  Only eight states and the District of Columbia uniformly pro-
tect an indigent person's need for counsel at the bail stage. 
Id. 
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before a judicial officer, who will determine whether they are re-
leased on recognizance or given bail pending trial, indigent defen-
dants often must act as their own advocate.  Indeed, only eight states 
guarantee counsel at an accused’s arraignment or initial appearance 
statewide.325  Twice as many states deny counsel everywhere within its 
borders;326 others provide for a lawyer’s representation in one or two 
select jurisdictions.327  Most states decline to consider the contradic-
tions of a criminal justice system that professes equal justice and pre-
sumes innocence for the poor, while denying counsel to accused in-
digents at the bail stage and incarcerating those who cannot afford 
bail.  Justice Scalia captured the dilemma of defendants’ “Dicken-
sian”328 experience during the initial 48-hour, post-arrest period of jail 
detention as they “await the grace of a . . . bureaucratic machine [to] 
. . . churn[] its cycle.”329  Most are without counsel when they finally 
appear before a judicial officer in a state’s pretrial system that resists 
accepting an “obvious truth that the average defendant does not have 
the professional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a 
tribunal with power to take his . . . liberty.”330  Most states refuse to in-
vest the necessary resources for assigned counsel’s immediate repre-
sentation at a bail hearing that triggers “perhaps the most critical pe-
riod of the proceedings . . . , that is to say, from the time of  . . . 
arraignment . . . until the beginning of . . . trial . . . .”331  It is at this 
initial stage when an accused’s quest to regain liberty may result in 
 
 325 Id.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West 1998) (California); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
1b (West 1994) (Connecticut); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 44 (Delaware); FLA. R. CRIM. 
P. 3.130(C)(1) (Florida); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 8 (Massachusetts); N.D. CT. R. CRIM. P. 44 
(North Dakota); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 44 (West Virginia); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 970.02 (WEST 
1985 & SUPP. 1996) (Wisconsin). 
 326 See generally Colbert, Do Attorneys Really Matter?, supra note 21, at 1723–24. 
 327 See generally id. 
 328 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 71 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 329 Id.  While awaiting a judicial officer’s probable cause determination, Justice 
Scalia addressed the plight of the “ordinary” and “presumptively innocent” person 
accused of a crime. 
Hereafter a law-abiding citizen wrongfully arrested may be compelled 
to await the grace of a Dickensian bureaucratic machine, as it churns its 
cycle for up to two days—never once given the opportunity to show a 
judge that there is absolutely no reason to hold him, that a mistake has 
been made.  In my view, this is the image of a system of justice that has 
lost its ancient sense of priority, a system that few Americans would 
recognize as our own. 
Id. 
 330 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462–63 (1938); see supra notes 302–03. 
 331 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
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saying something that ultimately jeopardizes the right to obtain a fair 
trial. 
Surely that was true for Donald Fenner.  His effort to persuade 
the bail review judge to reduce bail not only failed, but his words be-
came a crucial piece of the prosecutor’s case at trial.332  Fenner’s di-
lemma is not unusual, as indigent defendants across the nation speak 
without lawyers and make damaging statements at bail hearings.333  A 
judge interested in hearing the “truth” may easily rationalize asking 
an unsuspecting and uncounseled defendant to “say something,” 
without warning that the reply may later be admitted at trial.  Judges 
are not the only state actors who may be instrumental in causing an 
accused to speak.  A prosecutor’s provocative comment may generate 
a defendant’s response to correct an exaggerated or wrongful asser-
tion about the extent of criminal involvement or strength of the gov-
ernment’s case. 
While there is no way to know the extent to which Maryland 
prosecutors will look to bail proceedings to discover evidentiary nug-
gets to include in their case against an accused, Fenner’s bail hearing 
illustrates why these proceedings represent an untapped source and 
potential goldmine for prosecutors in their search for additional evi-
dence.  A skilled prosecutor will now examine the bail hearing and 
study the defendant’s reply to a judicial officer’s inquiry and other 
remarks.  While actual trials are rare, prosecutors could also use a de-
fendant’s recorded or transcribed statement during pretrial negotia-
tions to induce guilty pleas and further limit trial rights.  If a trial oc-
curs, defense lawyers would find it exceedingly difficult to overcome 
the weight that fact-finders place on a defendant’s recorded or tran-
scribed admission.  Following conviction, appellate defenders should 
expect the same result as Fenner’s attorney when he unsuccessfully 
challenged the trial court’s ruling.  Such statements by a criminal de-
fendant will likely be found voluntary or spontaneous. 
Fenner should dramatically change the nature of a prosecutor’s 
pretrial investigation and trial preparation by shifting attention to the 
importance of the bail hearing.  In the defender’s absence, state ac-
tors will assume a greater role in influencing what occurs there.  A 
judge, for instance, who has the reputation of favoring the prosecu-
tion, may see bail as the opportunity to ask and encourage an unrep-
resented defendant to speak.  A prosecutor, too, may try to take ad-
vantage and mislead an accused into speaking and uttering an 
 
 332 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text. 
 333 See supra note 174. 
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incriminating statement to be used toward conviction at trial.  Judges 
and prosecutors must be aware of the consequences to an accused’s 
right to a fair trial.  Minimally, they should inform an accused of 
Miranda advisements, although this is likely to convince only some 
unrepresented defendants to refrain from speaking.  To fully achieve 
this objective, an accused must have an attorney present. 
Predictably, other states will soon be deciding similar Fenner ad-
missibility issues.  They will be tempted to, but should resist, following 
the Maryland high court’s ruling.  Fenner had not preserved and 
therefore had not argued his right to counsel at bail.  Had full argu-
ment occurred, he and every indigent defendant would have had a 
very strong constitutional argument that bail ought to be considered 
a “critical stage,” and a powerful basis for convincing the Court of 
Appeals to follow McCarter’s statutory entitlement to legal representa-
tion.  In brief, a defense attorney’s presence at a bail hearing was the 
type of critical “event”334 that mandated counsel to ensure Fenner re-
ceived a fair trial.  Had an attorney been present, she and not Fenner 
would have spoken and advocated for pretrial release.  Fenner’s si-
lence would have left the prosecutor with considerably less impressive 
evidence and, arguably, inconclusive proof of guilt at trial. 
What then should other state appellate courts do when review-
ing the practice of non-representation in the lower court?  Which of 
the two trends, acceptance or rejection of a right to counsel at bail, 
should a state court follow when faced with the issue of whether to 
admit or suppress statements from an unrepresented defendant who 
speaks at a bail hearing?  One thing is certain: procedurally, appellate 
courts should refrain from sua sponte rulings on a non-certified, non-
preserved constitutional issue of such a “fundamental character”335 
that directly challenges the system’s ability to achieve equality and 
fairness for indigent defendants.  When deciding whether an unrep-
resented defendant’s inculpatory statement ought to be admitted or 
suppressed and other issues of such vital importance, courts must ap-
preciate the legal and “moral imperative” of ensuring defense coun-
sel’s full participation before deciding whether to travel the Gideon 
path336 or take a Betts detour.337 
 
 334 Utt v. Warden, Balt. City Jail, 427 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) 
(holding that because a governor’s extradition hearing does not touch upon an ac-
cused’s guilt or innocence, it was not a critical stage “where events occur that can af-
fect the entire trial”). 
 335 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963). 
 336 See supra Part V.A.  
 337 See supra Part V.A. 
COLBERT FINAL.DOC 3/7/2006  10:42:20 AM 
712 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:653 
VI. CONCLUSION 
An appellate court’s power to rule sua sponte should be used 
only in “most extraordinary” circumstances.338  Full appreciation of 
the high stakes of ruling without defense briefs and full participation 
should persuade an appellate court to act with extreme caution, es-
pecially when the non-argued constitutional issue involves the rights 
of an entire class of accused indigents.  When a court determines sua 
sponte ruling is absolutely necessary, it should take safeguards to en-
sure a court’s ruling receives respect and legitimacy within the legal 
community. 
When an appellate court is considering ruling on a constitu-
tional issue neither preserved for review nor briefed by both parties, 
it must take proactive measures and direct the litigants to respond.  
Ordering supplemental briefing ensures that the appellate court 
hears from parties who are most familiar with the issue.  Since the rul-
ing affects non-litigants’ rights, the appellate court must inform the 
outside community that it intends to decide an undeclared or non-
certified issue.  Publishing judicial decisions and court orders is the 
optimal way to notify the legal community of an appellate court’s in-
tention; it also permits interested outsiders to file amicus briefs to as-
sist judicial decision-makers with reaching a correct ruling.  Addition-
ally, appellate courts should invite affected parties to file amici briefs 
and consider the appointment of an independent, partisan advocate 
to protect the interests of non-litigants.339  Such appointments ensure 
that judges have a complete factual understanding of the circum-
stances that unrepresented defendants face at the bail stage and 
avoid any appearance of a defender’s conflict of interest.340 
In Fenner, the Court of Appeals denied indigent defendants a 
right to counsel at bail without full argument.341  In such instances, 
 
 338 See supra notes 221, 230. 
 339 In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the United States Supreme 
Court invited then Professor (and now Circuit Court Judge) Paul Cassell to orally ar-
gue and defend Congress’s power to pass a law that sought to overrule Miranda’s re-
quirements.  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443 n.7.  The Attorney General declined to do so.  
See United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 681 n.14 (4th Cir. 1999).  The Supreme 
Court stated: “Because no party to the underlying litigation argued in favor of  
§ 3501’s constitutionality in this Court, we invited Professor Paul Cassell to assist our 
deliberations by arguing in support of the judgment below.”  Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 
443 n.7. 
 340 The reference is to a Public Defender conflict of interest if the defender is re-
quired to represent indigent defendants without adequate resources at bail hearings 
should the Sixth Amendment or statutory right to counsel prevail. 
 341 Fenner v. State (Fenner IV), 846 A.2d 1020, 1022 (Md. 2004); see infra Part 
III.C.3 (discussing the court’s sua sponte denial of the right to counsel). 
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the court should order a rehearing to restore public confidence in 
the impartiality of the judicial process.  When an appellate court cir-
cumvents its baseline practice rules and decides an issue neither pre-
served nor certified for review, it must treat these transgressions suffi-
ciently seriously to warrant such an extraordinary remedy.  Fenner 
and indigent defendants are deserving of the opportunity to present 
a critical stage and statutory right-to-counsel argument. 
Fenner’s right to present full argument goes beyond protecting 
due process rights.  It ensures that the appellate court reach the 
proper result on the merits.  While Fenner’s advocates may, at first, 
consider it extremely unlikely that the high court will reverse a prior 
decision, they are able to mount a very strong argument.  Indeed, 
Fenner presents the classic example for why the bail hearing ought to 
be considered a “critical” stage and why counsel’s presence would 
“help to avoid . . . the potential substantial prejudice inher[ent] in 
the particular confrontation”342 between a defendant and a bail judge.  
In counsel’s absence, Fenner, like most unrepresented defendants, 
spoke in response to the judge’s inquiry and provided crucial evi-
dence for trial.343  A defense advocate would have immediately inter-
ceded and convinced Fenner not to say anything that might “dero-
gate”344 from his right to a fair trial. 
Before Fenner, the Court of Appeals had never ruled on indi-
gents’ constitutional right to counsel at bail,345 nor considered the 
impact of admitting an unrepresented defendant’s statement at trial.  
Without a defense perspective, Maryland’s appellate courts could not 
envision how Fenner’s statement might have occurred within a coer-
cive environment, how a judge’s open-ended question might com-
pare to an “interrogation” or “a trial like confrontation,” and how 
other defendants can be expected to reply in similar situations.  In an 
adversarial system, full-dressed argument is necessary to provide a de-
fense perspective that was missing from Fenner and that is essential for 
appellate judges’ understanding of pretrial detainees’ experience in 
the lower bail courts. 
 
 342 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967). 
 343 See id. at 224–27 (recounting precedent in favor of representation at any adver-
sarial confrontation). 
 344 Id. at 226.  In Wade, the Supreme Court interpreted “critical stage” to mean 
“any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s 
absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”  Id. 
 345 Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring).  In 
Mapp, Justice Douglas defended the Court’s sua sponte Fourth Amendment ruling by 
asserting that “the arguments of its antagonists and of its proponents have been so 
many times marshaled as to require no lengthy elaboration here.”  Id. 
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The spectacle of poor and typically uneducated people defend-
ing their liberty and right to a fair trial is no different today than the 
one-sided courtroom experience that Clarence Earl Gideon faced 
forty years ago.346  While from the Supreme Court’s perspective, 
“Gideon conducted his defense about as well as could be expected 
from a layman,”347 the same cannot be said about Fenner and others 
like him.  Today, defendants—whether in Maryland or in other 
states—go unrepresented, compelled to speak on their own behalf to 
regain liberty before trial.  When they do, they risk convicting them-
selves, contrary to the guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Measuring the impact of admitting an unrepresented indigent 
defendant’s inculpatory statement at a bail hearing should move ap-
pellate courts to chart a course that reestablishes their impartial and 
independent role as the protector of an accused’s right to a fair trial.  
 
 
 346 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
 347 Id. at 337. 
